

17 March 1993



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# ***JPRS Report—***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### U.S., Israel To 'Exterminate' Arabs

93AF0351A Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 14 Dec 92 p 4

[Article by 'Ismat al-Hawari]

[Text] It has been five years since the Palestinian intifadah started. This is a stone revolution that has no precedent in history. These are stones of baked clay, thrown by heroes who resemble the Ababil. [reference to heroic birds of the Koran] It is a continuous revolution that neither planes nor fleets can stop.

Stones have become the revolutionaries' weapon in Arab Palestine. There is nothing greater or more splendid than playing the lyre of stone. Now this age is accepting those revolutionaries with an open heart, and the revolutionaries are not weary of the methods of suppression, terrorism, and destruction used by the Zionists, who are the barbarians of the 20th century!

Our manhood had frozen. Our heroism had stiffened. Our dignity had vanished. Our unity had been torn apart. Our Arab nationalism had died. We experienced great differences of opinion. Our prestige was decreased. Our swords had become as though they were made of paper. Our cannons had vowed not to be fired. For years, Palestine had knocked on doors asking for bread from the tables of wolves and praying to God the forgivable, complaining and moaning from oppression and suffering. Palestine's features were nearly lost among the valleys and plateaus. After all that had been happening, Palestinian revolutionary anger makes a move to inflict its wrath on the tyrannous occupier. It sounds its loud roar: "Let us achieve jihad...let us achieve struggle!"

Yes, let us achieve jihad. The heroes of the occupied land are on their own. The Arabs of the 20th century are taking a neutral stand vis-a-vis the Palestinian revolution. They have no voice, and even if they had a voice, it would have been silenced. They accept all recessions and silent defeats. They are submerged in their passions while their Arab nationalism is being bought and sold at an auction. The heroes in Palestine declare the march to jihad, and yet the Arabs of the 20th century declare war on jihad!

### Let All Arabs Know

Let every Arab know that the Israeli and American gangs are waging a war of annihilation against the Arab people. Killing an Arab has become a sort of worship. Those cowardly criminal gangs force the Arab people to kneel down... They oblige humans to yield and ask Arab systems to live on the margin of events so that they can neither move nor mutiny and so that they show no anger or revolt!

Let all of the Arabs know that the Zionist butcher wants Arabs to be the same as the American Indians. He has read that in his Ten Commandments. His vicious dogs are snatching away at the martyrs' bodies. Children, the elderly, and women are being killed. They are being thrown from their planes alive. While all this is happening, the Arab systems remain as silent as stone. In fact all that these systems do is take part in an imaginary struggle.

The Arab sons should realize that the criminal aggressors have amassed all of the weapons of destruction and aggression, not so much for aggression against land, but against will...the Arab will to breathe freedom, our will to lead a human life. The criminals shamelessly and proudly declare that life is only for them and that the land from the Nile to the Euphrates should be theirs. All of these events happen, and the relaxed Arab systems see and hear them just like bystanders on the sidewalk!

What seems really strange is the fact that when a catastrophe took place in a far-off place on the planet, Arab rulers were quick to provide food, clothing, and medicine. Yet, they know that their brethren are dying daily both from enemy fire and from hunger that is eating them up. However, the Arab countries do nothing to save their brethren who face martyrdom for the sake of the Arab cause!

### Woe to the Criminal

The Israeli gangs—supported by America—are committing crimes against the innocent and helpless. These gangs are stationed in Jerusalem, the city of the holy shari'ah, the pearl of religions, the city buried in sadness, the city of the virgin. There are martyrs each day. These gangs break into our sacred shrine inside al-Aqsa mosque. The gangs fire at the kneeling faithful while they are worshiping the Almighty One. These gangs have no respect for our sacred places and shrines; they have no regard for our faith and religion!

Yes, woe to the criminal who is proud of his tyrannical strength. Woe to him and to whoever seduces him to abuse our women, who represent our dignity. Woe to those who break into our holy places. Woe to those who are living in the blessed Arab land even though they are both corrupt and corrupters.

Woe to the prejudiced criminal of our outrageous anger, of our fierce resentment. Although the Arab governments may have become frozen stiff, there are still millions of angry Arabs on the horizon. This is because the revolting anger has its followers, who are growing in number, coming from different directions.

Woe to these criminals when the beloved Palestinian land's earthquake erupts and angrily throws its stones with the fire of resentment and hatred, which is stronger than any arms that the enemy possesses!

Woe to the Zionist criminal when the signal for sacrifice was given by the occupied land. This signal declared a return of history and events to their right path. It inflicted punishment on the criminal and whatever else he deserved. This signal brought new life to Arab nationalism and brightened our dejected faces. It granted us dignity. Our Arab identity, which was nearly obliterated, was once more reinforced.

Let those who possess this tyrannous force know that the power they are proud of, the fire that they play with, the bullets they carry around, and the grudge that they fool around with is a cowardly force and that it will not destroy our heroism.

**Conclusion**

The grave hewn with the sword of the Arab faith will never be a hole of fire!

God has promised victory to the faithful, and they have promised him patience. If the faithful fulfill their promise, God will fulfill his promise to them!

**'Vicious Jewish Campaign' Seeks Egyptian Property**

*93AF0351D Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 5 Jan 93 p 5*

[Article by Wajdi Zayn-al-Din]

[Text] Israel is presently waging a vicious campaign to record all real estate property that was owned by Jews in Egypt before the founding of the Zionist state, and it is asking that the ownership of this property be restored. During an administrative court session in Al-Zuhur district at Port Said, this vicious campaign was revealed. During the session, an Egyptian citizen by the name of Luqa 'Abd-al-Masih Jibra'il raised doubts about the ownership of property No. 55, which is located at the corner of Safiyah Zaghlul and Shirbeen Streets. Jibra'il said that the property had been owned by a Jew by the name of Menahem Misha, who had left Egypt. In another incident, a lawyer informed the State Security Agency at Port Said that an Israeli representative had contacted him in order to take measures to restore the ownership of some properties that had been under the control of Jews before 1956. The properties in question were the "Barukh" and "Simon Arzt" buildings. It is also reported that some Jews met with some Egyptians in Rome and Athens to inform them of the intention to go along with procedures to restore ownership of property previously owned by Jews.

These strange incidents were raised, as I mentioned before, inside the administrative courtroom at Port Said. However, the true story is that Egyptian citizen Luke Abd-al-Masih had filed a lawsuit asking for the withholding of the sale of the property No. 55 at Safiyya Zaghlul and Shirbeen streets because it is state-owned. The citizen clarified this situation by indicating that the woman who was in charge of managing the property and collecting the rent had sold this property for 60,000 Egyptian pounds, although its real value exceeds 5 million pounds. Such an undertaking would be considered a waste of public money. There is a proverb that applies to what this woman has done, which goes: "The unowned was sold to the one who did not deserve it."

The citizen, who submitted a number of reports to those concerned, asked for the withholding the sale of the property because, although the women who sold it had claimed that she represented its owner, a British citizen who is not in Egypt, the truth is that this property came under state ownership after the departure of Menahem Misha. Consequently, the state is both the sole owner and the only party that has the right to do anything with it. So, what is the state's opinion about this case? We are awaiting an official reply as soon as possible.

**Ambassador Questions Iranian Motives**

*93AF0351B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 5 Dec 92 p 5*

[Article by Ambassador Mahmud Qasim]

[Text] Iran was heavily damaged and destroyed by the end of its war with Iraq, which lasted from 1980 to 1988. Oil wells, oil extraction equipment, oil storage facilities, and oil exports all suffered severely. However, Iran is presently increasing its oil production, regardless of its obligations as a member state of OPEC. OPEC sets limits on the quantity of oil produced by each of its member states. These limits recently led Ecuador to withdraw from the organization because it was angry at the fact that states that produce large quantities of oil, such as Iran, did not respect their obligations.

Iran has increased its oil production and has become the second largest oil exporting country, following Saudi Arabia. It increased its production from 2 million bpd during the war to 4 million bpd at present. It exports 75 percent of its production to Japan and Western Europe. This shows that Iran's oil exports have exceeded the exports of the rest of the oil-exporting countries, such as Venezuela, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Norway. Each of these countries' exports does not exceed 2 million bpd.

The political significance behind the fact that Iran is giving priority to the oil industry is obvious, although Iranian authorities do not mention it. The fact that Iran is second to Saudi Arabia in world oil exports means that it is fulfilling its ambitions to become the most important and most powerful state in the Gulf region. This ambition is an old one and has neither been affected nor altered by the change in the system of rule in Tehran.

Iran is planning to achieve this goal by using new oil money for a huge rearmament program. This program is causing anxiety among both regional powers in the Gulf and foreign powers from outside the region, especially the Western powers. During the past weeks, all of the reports coming from different sources, including the International Strategic Institute in London, agreed that Iran is getting three diesel submarines from Russia and a large number of advanced Scud missiles, with a range of more than 900 km, from North Korea. The reports also indicated that Iran's nuclear weapons program, which began with the purchase of a nuclear reactor from China, is entering the "danger" zone. According to this program, Iran is expected to be considered a "nuclear" country by the end of the 1990's. Analysts unanimously agree that Iran's political goals are not only confined to its becoming the most important regional power in the Gulf, but that its political targets far exceed this goal. In fact, there are indications that Iran—quite openly—is providing assistance to fundamentalists in Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, and Egypt. It is also exporting the Shiite revolution to those Central Asian countries that used to form a part of the former Soviet Union. Iran is also trying to divide Afghanistan. All of these are indications that imply that Iran is seeking the political domination of an enlarged Middle East that includes those former Soviet Union territories. Furthermore, Iran is hoping, under the pretext of religion, to

establish a new Ottoman Empire that would extend from the Chinese borders in the east to Morocco in the west. The capital of this empire would be Tehran, and its leaders would be the ayatollahs and their comrades!

If Iran's nuclear and navy development program allows it to dominate the Gulf region, then undoubtedly its nuclear and religious orientation, as well as its aspiration for expansion, would make the West consider Iran as the most important country in the Middle East. This would mean that Iran would be ahead of Israel and Turkey in importance. This is because, on one hand, it would then have the same nuclear weapons that Israel has, and, on the other hand, it would be using the religious cause to dominate the region; whereas Turkey has none of these assets. If this were to happen, the West would be obliged to deal with Iran in order to preserve the West's oil resources and its other interests. The price that Iran would have to pay for this would be the preservation of Israel's security. This agreement could be made as long as the West's interests are guaranteed and the safety of Israel is assured. This would happen regardless of the Arab states and systems having to suffer any harm from Iran.. There would also be no objection to the restoration of the good relations that existed between Iran and Israel during the shah's rule, and even during Khomeyni's rule, when Israel was supplying Iran with arms during the latter's war with Iraq. The "Irangate" scandal may still be remembered as a testimony to the fact that Israel played a principal role in the arms deal that was contracted between Iran and the United States.

Would the West, however, give Iran the time to become a nuclear power and fulfill its ambitions for expansion in the region? And would the West, in that case, be assured that Iran would not misuse the nuclear weapons it possesses, and direct them—perhaps in haste—in whatever direction it chooses in order to fulfill its ambitions and the ayatollahs fantasies.

Is the West unaware of the declarations of both Khomeyni and his successor, Khamene'i, on exporting the Shi'ite revolution to all of the regions of the earth in order to establish what they termed the "World Islamic State"? Could it be that the West is certain that those declarations on religion are merely for local consumption, whereas the constant elements of geography and history make Iran rely at all times on the West to protect her from the dangers that surround her? In this case, Iran would seem to be allied with the West at the world strategy level, and subsequently, could not abandon this alliance?

According to these indications, a question could be raised regarding the role that the West is planning for Iran to play in the Middle East, in general, and in the Gulf region, in particular, taking into consideration the roles assigned to both Israel and Turkey in the region?

Is the role designed for Iran that of disintegrating both the Arab and Islamic worlds on the pretext of exporting the religious revolution, so that Israel could assume responsibility for the whole Arab region's affairs and Turkey could assume responsibility for the affairs of the Central Asian

states, specially those where Turkish is spoken. Eventually, Israel and Turkey would reconstruct these two worlds after their disintegration and the disappearance of many of their ruling systems as a result of Iran's destructive role?!

Before speculating about any vision or particular scenario for the region after the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and the weakening of the regional powers in the area, what seems certain is that the West will not let Iran obtain nuclear weapons—as the vivid example of the Iraqis indicates. However, the West may permit Iran to achieve supremacy in other weapons, which would be a prelude for Iran to undertake its assigned role in the future, namely, that of reconstructing the Middle East map from the Chinese borders to Morocco.

The Arab world, in its distressing condition, could be—in terms of world strategy—considered a subordinate, not a decisionmaker. This is because the Arab world's states' domestic affairs, from the Gulf to the [Arabian] Sea, indicate a readiness for such a situation to happen. This will be so unless the unexpected happens and the Arab World's people awaken from their deep slumber and wishful thinking, matters that they indulge in, using religion as an excuse for laziness, dependence, flattery, and avoiding both work and responsibility. They are also just looking backwards, disregarding present circumstances and ignoring the future!

#### Official Reviews Saudi-Egyptian Relations

93AF0351C Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 7 Dec 92 p 7

[Article by Ambassador Salah Basyuni]

[Text] A regrettable phenomenon in Arab relations is that seldom do relations between two Arab neighboring or nonneighboring countries continue to be good for long. What usually happens is that these relations become tense, halted, and sometimes ambassadors are recalled. At this stage in the relations other Arab parties intervene. In fact, parties from outside may intervene and succeed where the Arab party had failed.

This phenomenon surfaced with regard to Saudi-Egyptian relations for a few years during the 1960's. It was observed that in spite of aggressive reaction from both the media and politicians on the Cairo side, the Saudi reaction seemed reserved—to a great extent—so that it left the door open for returning to a rational policy that avoided interference in each other's internal affairs, a policy that had been the norm during that period.

During the 1970's, when the late al-Sadat became president of Egypt, the Saudi policy succeeded in paving the way for obliterating the causes and stands that had caused tension in relations between the two countries. A new page was thus opened in the Saudi-Egyptian relations based on cooperation, understanding, and coordination. The leadership in both countries had much responsibility for restoring relations to the right path. When the late King Faysal of Saudi Arabia made the resolution used the halting of oil exports as a weapon during the 1973 October War, Saudi-Egyptian relations entered a new phase. At that same time, even though Saudi Arabia had accepted the

Baghdad Summit resolutions and kept them, thus breaking its relations with Egypt because Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel, Saudi-Egyptian communications did not stop, and commercial and cultural relations continued, as well. This state of affairs meant that the Saudi resolution to end its diplomatic representation in Egypt did not impact negatively on the essence of the two countries' mutual interests. This idea of mutual interests represents, in point of fact, the true spirit of relations between the two countries, as separated from political stands and diplomacy.

Because of this, Saudi Arabia was one of the first Arab countries to both support Egypt's restoration as a member of the Arab League and resume diplomatic relations with it. It also seems that with the resumption of diplomatic relations, the two countries were keen to make up for lost time. Therefore, summit meetings between the Keeper of the Two Sacred Shrines and President Husni Mubarak were resumed. These summits revitalized Saudi-Egyptian coordination in many areas besides political matters. These areas included security, the economy, manpower, education, culture, and the media. What should be indicated is the fact that this coordination between the two countries became institutionalized. This institutionalization took the form of the establishment of a joint ministerial committee composed of the ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries and the serious preparation for the regular meeting of this committee. This preparation was the job of the different ministries in each country, as well as committees composed of various specialized experts. Consequently, it became clear to both Saudi and Egyptian public opinion that serious work and real coordination was being undertaken for the mutual interest of the two brotherly peoples.

The fact that the leadership of both Saudi Arabia and Egypt had laid a sane and strong foundation for their relationship made it possible for intensive discussions to be conducted between them as soon as the Gulf crisis began to surface. In the days that preceded the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, those discussions focused on ways to solve the crisis and divert it from the path that it took after the invasion. At that time it was clear that there was a Saudi-Egyptian agreement to reach a solution that was agreeable to both parties. Unfortunately, the Saudi-Egyptian efforts failed because of Saddam Husayn's pre-determination to continue with the invasion. Later on, it became evident that Saddam's communications with Egypt were only a camouflage to permit him execute his plans for swallowing Kuwait and threatening all of the Gulf states. Because of this attitude from Iraq and its straying from the usual procedures in the relations between heads of states, the only procedure for Egypt to follow was that of making immediate political and military moves to face the aggression. Undoubtedly, this Egyptian move clearly showed Egypt's strong affiliation to and responsibility toward the Arab Nation. The graph that depicted Saudi-Egyptian relations and had maintained a steady flow over the years, showed an upward trend that displayed the strengthening of relations between the two countries in all areas. This strengthening of relations was fully portrayed by the way that Egypt moved—quickly and seriously. In spite of its economic difficulties, Egypt did not attach any

conditions or ask for any rewards. At the same time, once the war was over, Egypt made the resolution to withdraw the Egyptian troops, since those troops had finished their job, and proved that it was sincere in bearing its responsibility toward the Arab nation.

When the war ended, the Damascus Declaration was issued. Yet, there were differences in interpreting both its wording and execution. These differences in interpretation were due to the fact that at the time it was issued, everybody was very tense because of the catastrophe of the war and what the war had caused in the form of disasters and divisions in the Arab world. When sentiments returned to normal, there was a rethinking of both the whole situation and the impact of implementing the declaration. At this point, there were differences between Saudi Arabia and Egypt about how to interpret the declaration. Yet, Saudi-Egyptian diplomacy succeeded in overcoming any negative trends with regard to this issue, with the result that Saudi Arabia and Egypt could continue to work together and discuss affairs in the framework of the bilateral agreement between them. The work of the joint ministerial committee reinforced this statement. After the next-to-last committee meeting, which took place in Saudi Arabia, there was a meeting in Cairo of a number of Saudi and Egyptian businessmen to discuss all matters related to economic and financial cooperation in the fields of manufacturing, agriculture, commerce, and tourism. The two parties also signed some contracts. Therefore, it is clear that this conference made important and positive decisions that reinforced Saudi-Egyptian cooperation.

The meeting of the joint ministerial committee in Cairo ended last week.

Having reviewed the committee's declarations and final report, the following can be deduced:

- There has been complete agreement between the two sides with regard to the peace process in the Middle East. In addition, Saudi Arabia praised Egypt's stand and its efforts with regard to Iraq and the emphasis on its unity and independence, as well as the safety of the region.
- There was political agreement on how the disasters in Somalia and Bosnia-Hercegovina should be confronted.
- Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the Saudi minister of foreign affairs, did not miss the opportunity to refer to relations with Iran. He asserted that those relations should be based on confidence and mutual respect between Iran and the Arab countries.

As for economic cooperation, it is clear that the Saudi Development Fund is playing a significant role in financing a number of major projects in Egypt. The last of the projects that were partly financed by the fund was an agreement that offered a loan of 94 million Saudi riyals (which is equivalent to 83 million Egyptian pounds) to be used to finance the navigation canal project in the Sinai.

Total loans provided so far by the fund amount to about 880 million pounds.

What should be considered more important in the economic field, however, is the increase in the size of Saudi investments in Egypt that have been accomplished through agreements and contracts with the private sector.

Egyptian businessmen are also oriented toward investing in Saudi Arabia, particularly in the fields of industry and commerce.

As the evolution of Saudi-Egyptian relations is reviewed, one observes that these relations have become very good, which complements the national interests of both countries and which also reflects the historical ties between the two peoples across the centuries. It can be said that a number of factors play major roles in the continuity and positiveness of these relations. These are:

- The deep understanding of each side for the other's policy, as well as this policy's demands and limitations, whether on the local, Arab, or international levels. This understanding is also based on the principle that no one side will advocate a stand that hinders the other side's freedom of political movement.
- This understanding is also related to conditions in neighboring countries, global changes, and the present world order.

#### Seminar Studies Crises Facing Arab World

93AE0336A Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 22 Jan 93 p 8

[Report from Cairo by Sa'id Zaynham: "At Arabs in Changing World Seminar: The Crises of Identity and Assimilation Are the Toughest Future Challenges"]

[Text] Several warning signs are appearing on the Arab horizon. Challenges of various origins are multiplying, only to prove that the Arab world is going through a major rebirth and that the current state is merely a stage of gradual transition from a structure that is decaying in some areas and developing in others, to another that has yet to take shape.

The Arab nation is currently undergoing structural changes that reflect a fundamental change into a new society. Therefore, it cannot be fathomed and put to good use if taken one element at a time. It would be difficult, for instance, to comprehend economic development without identifying its interactive relationship with technological developments, especially in the field of advanced information systems (computers and communications), political change, the people's attitude toward the industrial age, changes in the state, and developments in the fields of production, industry, labor, etc.

The seminar *Arabs in a Changing World*, which was held in Cairo and attended by a select group of politicians, intellectuals, and scientists from most of the Arab countries, pointed out that several structural crises are clearly emerging in the Arab world. These are:

- the identity crisis;
- the crisis of distorted political development or growth;

- the crisis of Pan-Arab interaction, commonly known as the crisis of the Arab regional system; and
- the crisis of assimilating into a larger regional context and the various demands it poses.

According to Hasan Abu-Talib, head of the International Relations Department of AL-AHRAM's Center for Political and Strategic Studies, the important question is: Do the Arabs, from the Gulf to the [Atlantic] ocean, constitute a single Arab entity, or are they composed of several identities that are similar sometimes and dissimilar at other times? Does the existence of certain differences in customs, behavior, the thinking process, and historical experiences between the peoples of the Maghreb and of the Levant, for instance, mean that we are dealing with fundamental differences that mandate a focus on a multilateral Arab entity? Or are there differences in form only, and therefore simply represent different faces of a single Arab identity? Would a multilateral entity and a single identity be mutually exclusive, or will it be possible to create a degree of functional integration between them?

And what about the wider Islamic identity? What position do the Arabs occupy, and what role do they play within it?

Abu-Talib said that it would be difficult to raise such questions with regard to two issues. The first is the tendency among certain Arabs to be possessive of time and place. This tendency has materialized into regional groupings that necessarily were, and still are, hostile to the concept of a broader Arab entity.

The second has to do with the state of political Islamic groups in the various Arab countries. These groups sometimes exist side by side with Arab governments in countries, such as Jordan and Morocco that implicitly rely directly on Islamic slogans.

The Islamic identity is preeminent under the doctrine of political Islam. It is regarded as the larger vessel that holds the values of faith and religious solidarity based on crystallizing the concept of an Islamic nation into which all local and auxiliary identities are assimilated.

Discussing the crisis of imbalanced political growth, Abu-Talib explained that the most important issue related to political-economic development in the Arab region is one that deals with instilling the concept of human rights and acceptance of intellectual and behavioral plurality as a gauge of public right to movement and development.

Such imbalanced political development gave impetus to the growth of violent movements, both as an individual effort and as an organized collective endeavor. The question is not simply the incidence of acts of violence, murder, and sabotage. The issue has to do with an important value aspect—that is, the extent to which groups and social segments espouse the concept of change through force and the imposition of nonpluralistic mechanisms, as opposed to the return to comprehensive action as a way out of the crisis of political growth and development.

### Crisis in Arab Regional System

Abu-Talib reviewed the crisis that the Arab regional system has faced since its inception but was able over the past four decades to overcome many of those crises [as published], because in fact they were not directed at its existence and at all of its symbols and policies as they currently are and [have been] since the Gulf crisis two years ago.

The current Arab system crisis is not simply that of an ineffective or marginal regional organization (the Arab League), the League's weak charter, the propensity towards withdrawing into one's shell, the eruption of border disputes among Arab entities, or the lack of Arab institutions needed to settle intra-Arab conflicts. Rather, it extends beyond that to two grave issues. The first is for Arab empirical and political parties to review the bases for joint Arab action and to spread the doctrine of a new system of purely personal values and standards in dealing with other Arab parties.

The second issue is the total abandonment of resorting to the Arab house in order to contain conflicts. This conflicts with the implied meaning of Arabdom which the Arab system has been able to preserve throughout the past four decades. Perhaps a third related issue has to do with the disintegration of Arab consensus, which acted throughout the four decades as an important bond that identified the common enemy and defined the rules for dealing with it.

### Crisis of Assimilating Into Larger Regional Entity

This crisis is attributed to several factors. It is partly the result of the crisis of the Arab system as a whole, and partly the result of eminent likely developments that are primarily linked to future meetings within the framework of the political process to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute, which may result in having to accept Israel as a major integral part of the Arab region. Regardless of the outcome of those future meetings, the current settlement process, in both its bilateral and multilateral formats, will cause regional Arab reactions to crystallize on new bases.

The bilateral talks focus on settling the various aspects, at least theoretically, of the Palestinian cause over several integrated phases, on settling the future of occupied Syrian and Lebanese lands, and on laying the foundation for Israeli relations with the Arab countries that surround it. The multilateral talks, on the other hand, focus on devising a number of interrelated functions and arrangements that would restructure Arab regional relations both individually and collectively.

### Arab System and Challenges

Dr. Hilmi al-Hadidi said that indicators and evidence clearly show the weakness, ineffectiveness, and interior position of the Arab system in the econo-political map of the world. He added that the Arab system has been deteriorating since the late 1970s with the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war, the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

- Arab economic and development performance has declined since economic developments as a whole indicate that the Arab economy has come to suffer

more exposure, diminishing performance, and increasing pressure.

- Rising Arab indebtedness.
- Persistent Arab conflicts, border conflicts among neighbors, and the eruption of water crises among some of those countries.
- The Arab nation's food dependence has sharply increased and is threatening the independence of Arab political decisionmaking. Arab food imports are rising at the annual rate of 13 percent and has grown fivefold from the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's.

### Political Challenges

Dr. Hilmi al-Hadidi clearly identified the following as the most significant of political challenges:

- Dealing with fundamental causes (the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict). The most important challenge here is the absence of Russia, that other pole in a two-pole world, its backtracking on a policy of supporting Arab entitlements, its adoption of a policy of mutual interests with the United States, and its openness to Israel.
- The proposed new Middle Eastern Order that will be established after settling the Arab-Israeli dispute and the position of the Arabs in the order.
- The threat of partitioning Arab soil and stirring up ethnic identities, be they cultural, religious, or endemic (Iraq and the Kurdish nation, sectarianism in Lebanon and in Sudan, and religious conflicts in may parts of the Arab World).

### Economic Challenges

The Arab World is experiencing a escalation in geo-economic competition, but there seems to be little chance for the European Community and Japan because of the aforementioned factors.

In fact, the Arab reality is on the road to economic and structural reform because of objective domestic factors such including the population explosion (3 percent), expanding indebtedness, and the growing burden of foreign debt service.

This challenge is further aggravated by high levels of unemployment, haste in making careless decisions, and the obvious hesitancy that underlies many other decisions. The Arab system is therefore mandated to understand and digest the rule of the new world game, focus on self-development, abandon the policy of foreign dependence, deal with the future of the New World Order, and deal with various future powers on the basis of enlightened interests.

### Scientific and Technological Challenges

These are the most threatening challenges, according to Dr. Hilmi al-Hadidi. The Arab system is part of the southern system, and therefore has the following characteristics:

- Illiteracy is at unreasonable rates among individuals in the Arab nation. This is in itself a serious threat

- and an obvious cause of educational, economic, political, and cultural backwardness.
- New world developments are inadequately monitored because of deficient academic and research institutions and study centers, which are emasculated and relegated to minor roles, not to mention the narrow margins allowed intellectual, academic, and research freedoms because of political, social, and economic factors.
  - The scientific and research base in the Arab world is inconsequential and limited. Indicators show that the Arab world spends no more than .17 percent of gross national product [GNP] on scientific research, compared with expenditure of about 2.5 percent of GNP by the Israelis.
  - The coming wave of scientific information technology is so huge and complex that it cannot be digested by centralized and government agencies in the Arab countries. They must be faced on a broad societal level, which means that it is mandatory to revive the role of civil society and energize its intermediary agencies in order to terminate this lack of participation in propelling the development, productive, and cultural engine of the Arab nation.

Dr. Hilmi al-Hadidi emphasized that the challenges we face are primarily a self-generated domestic product of the way we handle ourselves and deal with our material, cultural, and human resources. An effective future existence will depend on our ability to change.

#### Foes of Islam

Dr. Haydar Ibrahim, director of the Center for Sudanese Studies in Cairo, said that there is, in theory, an Islamic concept that explains current trends and developments. We are at the gates of new era that poses a threat to the Islamic world.

The north, led by Christendom, has closed ranks with Judaism against the southern hemisphere of this earth, where Islam is the most important living dogma, encompassing a cultural plan based on man's subservience to God, as opposed to the intellectual materialism of Western culture.

#### Future Development of the World Order

Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa'id identifies the following factors that control world order development:

- The issue of persisting domination, which is no longer the sole domain of the United States.
- Tensions resulting from economic globalization.
- The state system crisis.

#### Potential World Order Developments.

He said that there are four such potential developments:

- A pyramidal world order with multiple centers of power.
- A balanced bloc system where fractionalization factors supersede unity and congruity among advanced capitalist centers and where the advanced capitalist

industrial world is divided into competing but balanced major blocs.

- An anarchist bloc system. Anarchy in international relations could take two forms. The first is a propensity of relations between major blocs for occupation, either because of fundamental developments in the balances of power or because conflicts and problems supersede coherence and congruity factors.

The second form would be an inability by the major world bloc to control conflicts among countries of the South and in parts of the North (Middle and Eastern Europe). Those conflicts would develop because nationalist, sectarian, and religious sentiments would sour and take on a fascist character.

An order of global partnership that would deal with such universal issues as environmental and epidemic problems, the spreading political refugee phenomenon, and population explosion problems.

Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa'id emphasized that the world order will develop primarily in a pyramidal fashion but that certain tensions will persist in relations among the centers of power. He added that a system of balanced blocs is another possibility, which presupposes the collapse of the multilateral world trade system. He explained that global anarchy would not be able to prevail if the major centers of power in the world determined to be self-sufficient or if competition for influence intensified among them.

#### Arab Economic Unity Council Report Published *93AE0343A Doha AL-SHARQ* in Arabic 6 Feb 93 p 12

[Report from Cairo: "Economic Unity Council Report: Arab Countries Lose \$11 Billion Annually Because of Carbon Tax"]

[Text] The Arab Economic Unity Council last week issued an important report on the influence of world developments on the Arab economy.

The first influence is European investment in Arab countries, which amounts to \$2.8 billion and which, as the report mentioned, is not expected to expand rapidly over the next few years (only between 7 and 11 percent) because European investments have been channeled to the former Eastern European countries which last year received more than \$7 billion in investments, loans, and aid.

In spite of this, the report said, there are indications of expanding European investments in the Arab petroleum sector, which are expected to amount to some \$90 billion over the next two years.

The second influence—the levy of a carbon tax on Arab petroleum—poses a threat to the Arab economy. That tax, the report asserted, is expected to reduce European demand for Arab petroleum by about 18 percent. Consequent annual losses to Arab countries are estimated at about \$11 billion.

The third aspect pointed out that some 165 Arab banks in European countries are facing major financial and structural difficulties as a result of European bank mergers and of the introduction of new banking regulations such as the Basle Commission resolutions, which will inflict considerable harm on Arab banks abroad. The report forecasts that more than 100 Arab banks will return from Europe over the next three years.

The report's fourth aspect pointed out that Arab exports could decline by up to 35 percent in aggregate volume as a result of increasing imports from Europe because of shipping, product quality, and low cost, in addition to protectionist measures adopted by integrated Europe, which may cause a decline in Arab exports in general, especially because such exports face quality problems and because of the specification requirements of European countries, which represent a serious challenge to Arab exports.

The most serious threat underlined by the report is that the balance of trade, which favors Europe, will continue to "tilt" in that direction after the European Common Market is complete, especially if Arab countries enter into separate agreements with the European Community, which negotiates as a single entity. The trade imbalance is also aggravating because Arab economic reform programs are eliminating subsidies and protective [measures], whereas European production subsidies are mounting. This is especially true in the case of European farm products, where subsidies amount to two-thirds of production costs, not to mention export incentives. This trend will create increasing difficulties for Arab farm exports.

The report's fifth aspect points out that the countries of Eastern Europe have a working-age population of about 69 million and suffer high rates of unemployment. The tendency of European countries to tap that pool of unemployed labor from the former Eastern Europe will put Arab workers in Europe at a disadvantage. The number of Arab workers in Europe is [likely to] continue to drop in the next few years.

#### **GCC Information Industry Meeting Planned**

*93AE0281B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic*  
*9 Jan 93 p 10*

[Report from Manama: "GCC Advertising Society Sponsors Seminar To Discuss Advertising Issues"]

[Text] A seminar for participants throughout the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states will be held in Bahrain this February to discuss a number of subjects and issues of interest to the advertising industry in countries of the region. Its objective is to inform participants of advertising activity, elevate the performance standards of advertising, and develop professional skills.

The seminar is sponsored by the GCC Advertising Society in cooperation with the International Advertising Society and is endorsed by the Ministry of Information in Bahrain.

The two-day seminar, titled "Advertising and the Challenges of Change," opens 15 February at the Diplomat

Hotel, where a number of experts and specialists in information and advertising will discuss a many issues.

Khamis Muhammad (al-Maqlah), vice chairman of the GCC Advertising Society and chairman of the Gulf Group for Advertising, said that "this seminar is the society's first function and the first of its kind in Bahrain. It will focus on the significance of advertising for markets in free economic systems."

He added: "In view of the growing importance of advertising in the GCC states, the seminar will discuss a number of issues of interest to the advertising industry on both regional and international levels."

The seminar will discuss such subjects as the importance of advertising for brand names, for consumers, and for the information media; advertising societies and their role in serving the advertising industry; self-organization for advertising agency operations; advertising and information media development; information media research; direct marketing; and public relations.

(Al-Maqlah) continued: "This seminar is especially important for advertisers, advertising agencies, information media, and all those concerned with advertising. It will be an opportunity to discuss the capabilities, opportunities, and challenges that face the advertising industry in the region."

The seminar will conclude on 16 February with a debate on "Technical Innovation—Locally or Internationally?" The Society's headquarters will be officially inaugurated during the seminar.

#### **GCC Countries' Information Budgets Increase**

*93AE0281A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic*  
*10 Jan 93 p 10*

[Report from Jeddah: "A 34 Percent Rise in 1992; Saudi Arabia Alone Accounts for 48 Percent of the Market"]

[Text] Information expenditure in the GCC states rose in 1992 to \$450 million from \$336 million a year earlier, according to figures released by the Arab Organization for Research and Consulting Studies.

Talal al-Dulaymi, chairman of the GCC Information Society and director general of Tuhamat-al-Muna International, said that those figures have to do with television and the press and do not include outlays for billboards, promotion, exhibits, videos, etc., which would add another \$100 million.

There was a marked increase [in outlays for information] in Bahrain (33 percent), Saudi Arabia (22 percent), and Oman (15 percent). Pan Arab outlays likewise grew by 12 percent.

Saudi Arabia accounted for 48 percent of aggregate spending [on information] in those countries. The year was characterized by the return of the Kuwaiti market to information spending at much higher levels than in 1991 (35 percent), but still below 1989 outlays.

The year was also characterized by satellite entry into the information spending by such entities as the Middle East Television Center and the Egyptian Space Channel. Their presence pushed Pan Arab spending up even though a number of media companies in this group disappeared and a number of others cut down on spending.

And 1991 was an extraordinary year due to a freeze on first-quarter spending because of the Gulf war and diminished spending in the Kuwaiti market. Nevertheless, a comparison between 1992 and 1989, the most recent ordinary year, reveals an increase of 13 percent.

Talal al-Dulaymi said that he expects the growth of information spending in the region to continue as a result of the consistent economic growth experienced by markets in the region and of the higher efficacy of information media thanks to the development and proliferation of satellite station. The latter will have a significant impact on audience distribution and, consequently, the need to enhance the techniques of planning publicity campaigns and their attendant studies.

There were also major developments in the press media in 1992 with the publication and development of more newspapers and specialized magazines.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### PLO Wants 2 Members on Negotiating Team

93P50093A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
4 Mar 93 p 2

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—The PLO is currently trying to obtain U.S. and Israeli agreement on changing the composition of the Palestinian delegation to the bilateral negotiations to include two PLO members in the negotiating team in the ninth round.

Informed Arab sources in Cairo told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the PLO is linking its acceptance of the U.S. plan for the historical return of the Palestinian deportees to the acceptance of PLO demands, especially that of including PLO members on the negotiating team.

In a memo presented to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the Palestinian negotiating team has noted that Israel's decision to lift the ban on contacts with the PLO means tacit Israeli acceptance of PLO members' participation in the ongoing negotiating process.

Concurrently, Palestinian sources in Cairo stated that, during its visit to Moscow at the beginning of this week, the Palestinian delegation under the chairmanship of PLO Executive Committee member Mahmud al-'Abbas (Abu-Mazin), asked the Russian Government to support the Palestinian request to include PLO members in the negotiating team.

The sources indicated that the delegation also asked Moscow to play a greater role in the negotiating process and to pressure Israel to return all of the Palestinian deportees.

### Hamas Sees Ansar-2 Prison as Positive Training

93WR0123Z London FILASTIN AL-ISLAMIYAH  
in Arabic Oct 92 p 44

[Article by Imad 'Abd-al-Rahman: "Story of Islamic Yusuf University"]

[Text] Gaza—Naming the biggest military detention camp for Palestinians (more than 6,000 detainees) after a university may seem strange. This is the detention camp in the Negev Desert which the occupation authorities call Qetz-iot. But it is no longer strange if one looks at the following testimonial that was issued from the detention camp.

In the Ansar-2 detention camp (a transitional station to moving the Negev), an intelligence officer, A. al-Adib, spoke to a Hamas member who was being investigated. The officer quoted Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the founder of Hamas: "Intelligence is wrong when it throws Hamas followers into jail, because they are going to emerge stronger, tougher, more aware, and more determined to pursue the path of sacrifices and struggle. Perhaps they will return to the detention camp, but the next time it will be for more serious reasons."

Hamas detainees look at the Negev detention camp as a mosque for worshiping, a university for studying, and a military college. They have been able to organize their lives in the tents in a positive and constructive manner. Idle time is unknown, which, in fact, influences the psychological atmosphere in which they live. Despite the extreme heat in the summer and cold in the winter, despite the torn tents and the constant suffering because of shortages of water, food, and medical treatment, and despite the harsh treatment by the detention camp administration, which understands only the language of gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, smiles are constantly on the believers' faces. Time is spent doing things that are useful and beneficial.

In recent years, the number of Hamas followers in detention camps increased, and the movement saw that it is more appropriate to concentrate on the development of its members and to put this matter at the top of its priority list. This mobilization has been the result of the experience of the movement's cadres, which developed into a daily intensive programs that have led Hamas members to acquire qualifications in several aspects:

The spiritual aspect: In addition to daily prayers, Hamas members display a remarkable activity in Koran reading and in reciting the al-Ma'thurat messages (a type of morning and evening repetitive prayers). They also fast Mondays and Thursdays, at least. In addition, they follow a nightly worship program known as al-Katibah [battalion] system. They wake up early—shortly after midnight—and spend the rest of the night in prayer and glorification until sunrise. This takes place every day of the week.

The cultural aspect: The daily programs are akin to a university system, consisting of lectures that might exceed four a day, and using the course and level system, which to some extent is a similar to the credit hour system. Under this system, the detainees are organized at different levels,

according to age, inclinations, and educational standard. Students are given a fixed period of time, 30 to 40 hours, after which they have to pass a test and earn a certificate that qualifies them for promotion to a higher level.

The courses include: Koran studies (including recital, learning by rote, and interpretation); the Prophet's life story; jurisprudence; and a tradition known as shari'ah studies. This is in addition to ideological, political, and security studies, as well as practical studies that strengthen the members affiliation to the movement and its objectives.

Despite the scarcity of books and reference materials because the authorities have banned them, the detainees are helped in this regard by qualified people—a large proportion of Hamas members are university graduates. These members produce booklets that cover various branches of knowledge and science. Certain important materials are difficult to obtain from outside the detention camp because of security restrictions by the authorities. The detainees study these booklets in order to compensate for what they lack in several fields, such as political, security, and intellectual matters. They find what they need in those booklets. In order to preserve these booklets, they are copied in very fine script on flimsy papers and put into capsules that are easy to swallow or conceal in case the detainees are subjected to what is known as "repression," which occurs when the detention camp administration launches surprise raids on the detainees' tents in order to confiscate anything produced by the detainees. In addition to courses, there is what is known as specialized classes for specific and select groups of detainees in order to acquire qualifications in the fields of public speaking, administration, journalism, security, political action, and perhaps military action.

Additionally, there is the system of grades and training courses. In addition to magazines, there is the system of twice-daily leaflets, which are issued by the movement's leadership and which cover developments and daily affairs. There is a daily news bulletin that is prepared by a committee that follows the news clandestinely through a microphone hidden inside (...in...) [as published], because radio is still banned in the Negev camp. There are also weekly and bimonthly magazines that cover several subjects. One of these is the popular weekly RIHLAH MA'A AL-MIJAHDIN, which deals mainly with news about the detainees, foreign affairs, and news from other prisons. There also is the weekly SAWT HAMAS AL-USBU'I. In addition, the Literary League is concerned with literature and poetry, and 'UYUN AL-MAJD covers security matters. All of these products are cleverly hidden in what is known as the archives. (There are security, political, cultural, and administrative archives). All of these materials are often sent outside the camp or remain hidden in order to benefit from them.

What is interesting is that there is a great desire to combat illiteracy, and persistent efforts are being made in order to eliminate it. Many illiterate people leave the camp after having learned to write and to read from the Koran and from newspapers.

The detainees hold weekly artistic evenings. They stay up late into the night chanting, singing, and watching skits that depict life in the Negev. If the singing becomes loud, if the laughter becomes noisy, or if the clapping is heard, the camp administration does not hesitate to punish those people by forcing them to jog during the night, by putting some of them in solitary confinement, or even by spraying them with tear gas.

Although the camp administration bans physical training, particularly by a large number of people, the detainee evade it by practicing karate and other physical games inside the tents. They also jog and perform calisthenics. The administration often finds sticks used in martial arts and confiscates them. The detainees are allowed to play volleyball and table tennis.

In the Negev detention camp there is sand, heat, snakes, and barbed wire, plus the isolation caused by being hundreds of kilometers away from one's family. But life in it has its sweetness and bitterness. Its particular sweetness can be tasted only by those who have lived the Negev life. This taste remains in one's mouth even after leaving the Negev. It turns into longing and yearning.

No sorrow will be felt if a detainee goes back for a second time.

#### **Editorial Examines New Party, Leftist 'Crisis'**

93AF0387B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 12 Feb 93 p 5

[“News Analysis” column by Husayn Hijazi in Nicosia: “Arafat’s ‘Principle of State’ Victory Faces Palestinian Left With ‘Schism Option’”]

[Text] In the occupied territories, they are determined to proclaim a new party, now that those splitting away from the Democratic Front decided the partnership relating to the rights to the name. Preparations are now taking place for the Fifth Conference of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, more than a decade after the Fourth Conference. On 22 February, the Democratic Front will find a place in the al-Yarmuk Camp near Damascus to raise the banner that says, “This day was a new dawn in the life of the people and the revolution.” It has been 24 years since its dawn broke, and the intensity of its truth has not changed, just as if it had dawned yesterday.

A little while back, the Communist Party adopted some mandatory terms, in the days when Gorbachev's perestroika was still taken seriously. It had not yet been revealed to be a huge laughingstock. This is how the Palestinian Communist Party came to be the People's Party, and instead of the proletariat, they brought all the classes of the world. Between these events and those, some affecting scenes occurred, such as the Central Committee of the Popular Struggle Front's uprising against its secretary general, Dr. Samir al-Ghawshah, whose chose Tunis as an alternative to Damascus, announcing for the first time the alliance of the 10 groups that joined for the first time what might be described as the coalition of all Palestinian forces opposed to the centrist movement.

What is happening, then, inside the Palestinian leftist camp, for this whole movement to appear all at once, and in a short time, no more than two years? The response to this could be summarized in one phrase: the feeling of the pressure of some crisis. This crisis is, actually, the fact that this camp and all of its factions have reached a critical point that might be called the culmination of weakness and erosion, in two main factors:

The first is the balancing process in the equilibrium of the polarizing of Palestinian forces, which began to coalesce as a new course inside the Palestinian movement with the establishment of Hamas in the 1980's as a rival power to the traditional Palestinian nationalism. It is a grass-roots process that to a large extent resembles the birth of the Fatah movement in the mid-1960's as a movement that challenged the PLO itself. The establishment of Fatah at that time led to political and ideological changes in the general direction of the Palestinian political movement. It was the basic factor that hastened the crystallizing of the Palestinian left as an ideological option at the end of the 1960's. It is the appearance of Hamas now that is playing this decisive role in refashioning the Palestinian movement anew. In this sense, it is worth remarking upon the historical significance of the birth of this political force, with an initiative similar in its meaning to the initiative that founded Fatah. Both were initiatives that responded to a certain situation—a loss of direction or imbalance of power.

The complications caused by this convulsion—the dimensions of the break in the traditional structure of the Palestinian movement with regard to the Palestinian left, can be summarized in the single question this new reshuffle asks of the inner game and balances of power from the aspect of the left's position in the rank of this balance.

Second: The other factor is in the growing dimensions of the changes taking place in the opposite direction inside the Palestinian mainstream, especially with regard to the remaking of the bases of Palestinian political action from the strategic aspect, once this direction began to move closer to the notion of political legitimacy on the basis of a state and institutions, as an alternative to the principle of the political party—the faction that was suitable to days gone by. In this sense, the questions and challenges posed by this change at the level of views and method as regards the left with the means of the manner of dealing with a situation in which constitutional legitimacy (elections and institutions) replaces revolutionary legitimacy. What are the organizational and political changes that must be made in order to adjust to this essential change in the bases of the political game, especially if an agreement on the transitional authority in the current negotiations puts Palestinian political action as a whole in a context different from anything the Palestinian movement has ever experienced before?

But if it is possible to view Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh's announcement of the establishment of a political party in the occupied territories that is suited to the current trend of change, competing with the direction of the course, then

the question that this initiative poses is not related to whether the announcement of the birth of this political party may represent an element of change for the other parties and factions. It is related to whether a party like this possesses the fundamentals of political and intellectual character or not. The answer is no, because it is not enough to have the formula for giving a political speech adapted to an ephemeral phase in the political mood of any national group. But this party absolutely must reflect two conditions: first, an independent will capable of acting alone and with the inspiration of its material and political independence, and second, that this will respond to a political and intellectual direction that grants it legitimacy and support. While the first condition may be the focus of debate or controversy, the second factor is the one that is entirely lost in this story. In this way, this new party may be no more than another expression, albeit more organized, of the state of the nominal relations between Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat and the leader of this party. So the latter is more like an aide to the former, rather than a new political leader on the Palestinian scene.

Although there may be no further evidence than this last example, those tempted by the great delusion from which the Palestinian left as a whole suffers, now see a certain sharp fracture between final assimilation, and dissolving into the Palestinian mainstream—or going headlong into parallel extremism, into an opposite orbit, with everything that choice implies in terms of regional alliances.

#### Report Profiles PFLP-GC History, Sponsorship

93WR0147Z London *AL-MAJALLAH* in Arabic  
13 Jan 93 pp 20-22

[Article: "Ahmad Jibril..."]

[Text] London—The name of Ahmad Jibril, the general secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), has been mentioned often recently—most recently, when he held a press conference in West Beirut and announced his support for the kidnapping and killing of the Israeli soldier. This was the operation that the Israeli Government responded to by deporting 415 Palestinians from the occupied West Bank and Gaza to southern Lebanon. Who is Ahmad Jibril? What are the hidden sides of his life? How did he change from being an officer in the Syrian Army into a man whom Western security agencies consider one of the world's most dangerous men?

The name of the general secretary of the PFLP-GC, Ahmad Jibril, has leaped into the spotlight many times in recent years. His name was frequently mentioned in the media when the American Pan Am airliner exploded over the village of Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. He was held responsible for the operation, which he was thought to have executed in collaboration with Iranian overseas intelligence—Libyan intelligence was also charged with executing the operation.

Ahmad Jibril became wanted by several official Western agencies. At the same time, he began to gain popularity

among the ranks of some Palestinians who believed that he was the only person operating on the military scene against Israel.

In fact, information about the man's origin and birthplace is surrounded by obscurity. The Palestinian encyclopedia edited by the late Ahmad al-Mar'ashli, but subsequently withdrawn by the PLO Executive Committee, indicates that he was born in the town of Yazur, on land occupied in 1948. Late in the second half of the 1950's, he, like other young Palestinians, joined the Syrian Army. These men, who formed the nucleus of the Palestine Liberation Army, included, among others, Ja'far Haddad, Musbah al-Budayri, Muhammad al-Sha'ir, and Mahmud 'Azzam.

Some of these officers, like Mahmud 'Azzam, chose to remain in the Syrian Army—in the late 1960's and early 1970's he became one of the most important officers of the Syrian Air Force. Others, like Ja'far Haddad and Musbah al-Bulaydi, joined the Palestinian Liberation Army. Still others, like Yusuf 'Urabi, joined the Fatah movement at an early date. Ahmad Jibril, who later used the pseudonym "Abu-Jihad," tried to form his own organization with a few young Palestinians. At the time, it was called the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).

Although Jibril was and remained an active officer in the Syrian Army, he was able to form his own group on the eve of the June 1967 war. The group included 'Ali Bushnaq, who was also an officer in the Syrian Army at the time. Bushnaq's roots went back to the Bosnian region, his family having migrated to Palestine during the notorious Balkan war of 1912.

### Constants, Variables

Perhaps two events were most influential in shaping the character of this man, who has shifted loyalties several times in the last three decades while maintaining two basic constants over these years: not offending or distancing himself from Syria, despite the vicissitudes and changes of the period, and a deep-seated, lasting hostility toward Fatah and Yasir 'Arafat.

As for the two events that influenced the shaping of the man's character, some circles mention that Ahmad Jibril cooperated with Syrian military intelligence under the well-known regime of Salah Jadid and exposed an attempted coup immediately after the June defeat. This led to the imprisonment in Damascus of Dr. George Habash, who at the time was the leader of the Arab Nationalists Movement allied with 'Abd-al-Nasir. The same circles indicate that Syrian military intelligence itself made it easy for the officer, who had the rank of major at the time, to smuggle in a quantity of arms, including about 13 RP-2 mortars, for his own organization. The arms were a matter of the greatest importance at the time.

Strangely, Jibril himself, whom some circles accused of collusion to thwart the aforementioned coup, in which his comrade and later deputy 'Ali Bushnaq (who died 1969) was accused of involvement, participated with Dr. George Habash in forming the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—Habash having escaped from Shaykh

Hasan Prison with help from the former director of Syrian intelligence, 'Abd-al-Karim al-Jundi, who later committed suicide. However, some people, who doubt the information, point out that Ahmad Jibril did not have the influence to carry out such roles at that time.

The partnership was not destined to last long. Ahmad Jibril found it impossible to have the scope he dreamed of in the context of a Haddad organization born from the womb of another Haddad organization, the Arab Nationalists Movement. He soon left the PFLP and formed his own organization, which he named "the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command" (PFLP-GC), on the ground that he had been the military cornerstone in the general command of the PFLP.

During this period, which lasted from mid-1968 to the departure of the Palestinian resistance from Jordan in July 1971, the PFLP-GC remained a marginal organization. It received protection from the pro-Syrian Popular Liberation War Vanguards organization (al-Sa'iqa), on which it relied in many matters.

It should be noted that despite its smallness and meager resources, the PFLP-GC, led by Ahmad Jibril, carried out some significant operations at the end of the 1960's, particularly in the Jordan Valley. During this period, the organization was distinguished by its mastery of operations involving the use of mines and military explosives technology.

### Lockerbie Airliner

Those who charged Jibril with responsibility for the operation of blowing up the Lockerbie airliner apparently took into account his front's specialization in military explosives technology. After the front began obtaining unlimited resources from Libya during the second half of the 1970's, it began to develop its expertise in this field, relying at first on its previous modest expertise, which was considered an important advantage, compared with the resources of the other Palestinian resistance groups. Although it is still unproven, some circles think that Jibril was greatly influenced by Dr. Wadi' Haddad, with whom he worked for a limited time in the PFLP. Haddad is known to have developed the theory of revolutionary violence in the Palestinian arena and sanctioned the method of hijacking airplanes and overseas operations; what distinguished him from his imitators was that he never aimed his weapons at Palestinian or Arab targets even once.

According to reports from some of Jibril's colleagues, during the well-known, infamous events of July in Jordan, Jibril, who at the time headed a small group that remained with him in the city of Irbid about 90 km north of Amman, invented an effective way of using mortars as side mines placed on the sides of roads to secure the city against Jordanian armed forces.

### Lost Period

After the Palestinian resistance groups left Jordan, Jibril and his organization, like many Palestinian organizations, lived through a period of loss. Although his front, the PFLP-GC, especially after it was able to establish its base

in Lebanon, where matters began to get out of hand with the beginning of the seventies, was represented in the PLO Executive Committee by its number-two man, Talal Naji (Abu-Jihad), it continued to be considered a minor secondary group compared with Fatah, the PFLP, the Democratic Front (DFLP), and even the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front and the pro-Syrian al-Sa'iqa.

According to many sources, Jibril is said to have relied on Syria during these years and on a certain allotment that he drew from the PLO's Palestine National Fund, in addition to some modest individual contributions.

However, after long suffering and poverty, Jibril finally stumbled on hundreds of millions of dollars when he became acquainted with Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. The story, which resembles one of the Arabian Nights, is that the PFLP-GC leader met the Libyan leader in the wake of the well-known downing of a Libyan civilian plane by Israeli fighters over the Sinai in which former Libyan Foreign Minister Salih Buwaysir was killed. Jibril offered to retaliate by aiming a strong blow against an Israeli population center.

Because al-Qadhdhafi, who was thinking of launching his Green Book, needed a flashy operation, he gave Jibril a sum of money. Opinions about its size varied. Some said that it was \$20 million; others said \$50 million; still others placed it at \$100 million, which was undoubtedly exaggerated. The PFLP-GC general secretary received the money to buy gliders and launch kamikaze attacks on an Israeli city to avenge the downing of the Libyan civilian aircraft over Sinai.

Having received the money and sent pilots to certain communist countries for training in suicide missions, Jibril returned to Col. al-Qadhdhafi, who kept asking for information about the attack on the Israeli city. Jibril returned the entire sum to al-Qadhdhafi, saying that he was a trustworthy man: He was returning the sum, on one hand, because he had been unable to carry out the operation as promised and, on the other hand, because such a large operation would require twice as much money.

Eyewitnesses said that al-Qadhdhafi, who had been stung more than once by the same trick and had often paid money with no return on promises to carry out similar operations, felt that Jibril's act of returning the money showed "Arab gallantry." He immediately gave Jibril twice the sum, even if he had not carried out the promised operation, which may have been difficult or impossible due to the presence of advanced Israeli early warning devices.

Thus was cemented the relationship between Jibril and his organization and Libyan agencies. In addition, he was closely connected to the number-two man in Libya, 'Abdal-Salam Jallud, and others considered to be centers of influence in the Libyan Jamahiriyyah.

A senior Palestinian leader has estimated what Ahmad Jibril received from 1975 until his 1982 departure from Beirut at approximately \$1 billion in the form of cash and large quantities of weapons stored near Damur, south of

Beirut. Israel is said to have seized all of the weapons during its invasion of Lebanon. The figure is hard to confirm, although Israel did seize large quantities of weapons that are said to have belonged to the Ahmad Jibril group.

#### From the Jaws of Death

However, Ahmad Jibril, who was surfeited with unimaginable quantities of weapons and money, still suffered from low popularity on the Palestinian scene and from a lack of presence in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. There are different explanations for this. Some said it was because Jibril grew up and matured in Syrian Army barracks, far from the Palestinian scene. Others said that his first group was from the small and isolated al-Nayrab Palestinian camp in Aleppo. Others traced the phenomenon to the nature of his alliance with Syria. Some said that the Fatah movement, with its great influence, especially in the early years, encircled him and isolated him from Palestinian popular depth.

Whatever the explanations and their degree of truth, the fact is that Ahmad Jibril, despite the resources that his work with Libya provided, was unable to turn his organization into a major force on the Palestinian scene. He made exhausting efforts in this regard, once by joining the Rejection Front that Iraq formed in the second half of the 1970's, and later by establishing the current Salvation Front, which is considered to be Iran's striking arm on the Palestinian scene against the moderate policy that the PLO has adopted.

Ahmad Jibril's misfortune may have been that when he began his rise in the mid-1970's, when the money and resources he received from Libya began to qualify him for a large role on the Palestinian scene, he received a great setback when the PFLP-GC split in two and such founding officials as Tal'at Ya'qub, Muhammad 'Abbas (Abu-al-'Abbas), 'Ali Ishaq, Ahmad Najm, 'Ali 'Aziz, and Abu-Saji left to form their own organization, which gave its loyalty to the Palestinian leadership, the PLO.

On the eve of the split, Jibril miraculously escaped from the jaws of death. When the notorious clash between the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese National Forces led by Kamal Junblatt, on the one hand, and Syrian and Syrian-allied forces, on the other hand, took place, Abu-al-'Abbas turned on his former leader in the PFLP-GC and was able to take him prisoner without any resistance. He would have carried out a death sentence on him, had Chairman Yasir 'Arafat not intervened at the last minute.

Although 'Arafat got Jibril safely out of Beirut that year and into Syria, the PFLP-GC leader, who after leaving Beirut in 1982 became even more connected to Libyan agencies, played the main part in the split that took place in Fatah in spring 1983. The split was led by two former Jordanian army officers, Abu-Khalid al-'Amlah and Muhammad Sa'id Muraghah (Abu-Musa).

According to allegations by many in the Palestinian resistance, Jibril's connection to the Libyans was strengthened by the fact that he took charge of liquidation operations

against a large number of Libyan opposition figures and leaders overseas—operations that Col. al-Qadhdhafi in the early 1980's called "killing stray dogs."

Other allegations are that in addition to trying to split Fatah and the Palestinian scene and liquidate many Libyan opponents overseas, Jibril carried out several operations for Libyan intelligence targeting American and French officials in Lebanon and in a number of Western capitals and cities.

#### Toward Iran

Strangely, although Jibril was a major figure in the rejection front that the Iraqi regime formed in the second half of the 1970's and was accused of having played a role in the disappearance of Lebanese Shi'ite leader Imam Musa Sadir, he found that Iran's doors easily opened to him when he began knocking on them from the beginning of 1983. Jibril had never been known to be religious at any time in his life. Indeed, he was inclined toward Marxist, leftist, and nationalist ideas. He turned toward Iran overnight, grew a beard, and began to echo Iranian terminology, such as "the deprived," "the Great Satan," "the idol," and other such terms from after the Khomeyni revolution.

As time passed, and as Col. al-Qadhdhafi, under increasing pressure in the wake of accusations of responsibility for the Lockerbie operation, began closing the doors of his Jamahiriyyah to all revolutionary movements and violent organizations, Ahmad Jibril moved his headquarters and operations center to Tehran and became the gateway for Iranian influence on the Palestinian and entire Arab scene. Confirming this fact, Jordanian authorities discovered that Jibril had been personally involved in transferring funds from Iran to the notorious Islamic Mobilization Youth Movement that two Jordanian parliamentary deputies, Layth Shubaylat and Ya'qub Qirish, were accused of forming. It should be mentioned in this regard that Jordanian security arrested a number of PFLP-GC members on charges of weapons possession and preparing for actions affecting Jordan's security and safety. Also confirming this fact, PLO agencies discovered that the PFLP-GC was involved in intelligence operations for Iran among Palestinians in Lebanon, Yemen, Tunisia, and some other places.

Earlier information said that Ahmad Jibril had attended a Tehran conference of many fundamentalist and radical organizations from Arab and Islamic countries and had expressed willingness for his organization to be a bridge for Iranian aid to these organizations, including Ennahda in Tunisia, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, al-Jihad in Egypt, and similar organizations in some Gulf and other Arab countries.

Despite all of this, followers of Palestinian developments believe that Ahmad Jibril now has become one of the most important Palestinian leaders because of his military activities in the field. This means that his head has an even higher price on it than before.

#### AL-SAFIR Analyzes PFLP Congress

93AF0423A Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 23 Feb 93 p 10

[Article by Muna Sakariyah]

[Text] Damascus—The "historical greeting" to the leader of the socialist system, the "Soviet Union," was absent from the final statement of the Fifth Congress of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], which was held 12 years after the fourth congress convened in 1981.

During the congress, which was extended several days beyond its announced duration (12-17 February), Marxist theory was subjected to an extensive critical discussion. The PFLP was guided by the historical dialectical materialism method, which is the essence of Marxism, because Marxist-Leninist texts require a great deal of study and close examination.

Recognition of the problematic nature of Marxist theory as a program was one of the exercises in self-criticism discussed at the fifth congress. Discussion of this issue is ongoing, starting with established socialism and the method of applying it in both the more developed and developing countries. It also covers the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of other forces vis-a-vis the Leninist statement that considers "imperialism the highest level of capitalism," whereas capitalism is self-renewable.

Also discussed at the congress was the effect of technology on the status of the working class in capitalist countries and other ideas and slogans.

The PFLP held its fifth congress this month amid extraordinary circumstances imposed by international changes. These changes have brought about the end of regimes, ideas, and ideologies. Moreover, they have led to an unprecedented world order accompanied by the eruption of ethnic and religious strife in more than one place.

#### Challenges

The challenges generated by these changes were discussed at the congress in a debate that overflowed with ideological nomenclature (e.g., radicalism). Emphasis on the armed struggle remained a constant. However, attention was focused primarily on the subject of the "interior [the occupied territories]" as a central link in the Palestinian struggle, and on the question of whether the current phase is a new phase or the continuation of previous phases.

The answer to this last question at the congress was: "We are on the threshold of a new phase, in which the time factor will decide the course of the current political process (i.e., the peace talks)."

A conflict exists in the Palestinian arena between two courses. One course, which is represented by the Palestinian right's acceptance of administrative self-rule, would mean entry into a new phase. The other course would result in the opposite if rejectionist forces can stop the political approach.

### Something New

"Democracy and renewal" was the slogan at the closed congress, which was not attended by representatives of other forces. Did the results substantiate the true meaning of this slogan?

A prominent PFLP leader mentioned four political renewal measures concerning the PFLP's internal regulations, which are designed to deepen democracy. They are:

- Introduction of the principle of a referendum to the party base to decide basic issues in the organization.
- Introduction of an article stipulating the establishment of a general national council, which, in emergencies, would be convened by three of its members or by the central committee to make decisions as the proxy of the congress.
- The election and empowerment by the congress of a central control and inspection committee that will be tasked with inspecting practical, party, and financial matters throughout the organization.
- The election of a central committee secretariat that will be tasked with managing daily affairs in lieu of the central committee and the political bureau.

The congress also approved two new documents, which are:

- A theoretical document that discusses the crisis and problems of Marxism (it has a phased, strategic character).
- A program document, which will be issued publicly in a separate booklet that will differ from the present political report.

According to the leader, the renewal [an aspect of the congress's slogan] concerns a comprehensive renewal of ideas and programs, not the abandonment of Marxism. It is also "the renewal of leadership organizations (40 percent of the central committee membership and more than 50 percent of the political bureau have changed). Young leaders have taken over most of the positions in the central committee and in practical areas. They are distinguished by their scientific, military, and feminist credentials, which will facilitate change process without descent into the trap of divisions...."

The leader denied that the PFLP is made up of "currents." "Rather," he maintained, "it comprises opposing ideas, which have produced conclusions that have led to positive results on a new level regarding leaders and ideas. The atmosphere at the congress was distinguished by the presence of more than one opinion regarding a single issue."

When asked to identify the most salient points that dominated the discussion and debate, the leader mentioned "subjects concerning the Palestinian interior, rejection of the settlement course, and adherence to the national Palestinian program."

He added: "The PLO leadership's role and political course was the main topic of discussion. That role and course were censured sweepingly at the congress, because the

political program which they represent damages the Palestinian cause. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the PLO is a morale-boosting entity for the Palestinian people and must be preserved."

The leader continued:

"There were also discussions about official and popular inter-Arab relations. Regarding popular relations, the PFLP considers itself a part of the Arab liberation movements. Its relations with the Arab regimes are defined based on support for the Palestinian people's struggle to obtain its rights, whether recognition of a Palestinian state and the PLO, or the safeguarding of the Palestinian people's rights and abstention from establishing political relations with the Zionist entity."

"As for international relations, due to international changes, what has adversely affected the socialist system has also adversely affected the socialist system's support for the Palestinian people's struggle."

### Measures

Where is the retreat, and where is the approach in this congress?

The leader responded:

"The statements that were theoretically taken for granted in the past—the socialist system, the working class, liberation movements in the world—no longer make an impression."

"Regarding the aspect of struggle, the PFLP has undertaken to reduce its overt manifestations by deciding to close numerous offices and to reduce the number of its full-time personnel in every field, especially on the military level, because the occupied interior is the basis of the struggle, whereas abroad constitutes a reserve in the current Arab situation."

### Acknowledgement

The criticism that the PFLP leveled against numerous issues at its fifth congress was no less than the criticism that it leveled against itself. It acknowledged its failure to unify democratic and leftist forces in the Palestinian arena, as indicated by the lack of any positive achievements in this regard in the period between the fourth and fifth congresses. As a result, the Palestinian right has come to control Palestinian decisionmaking. The Congress also acknowledged its weak performance regarding the main problem in PFLP political thought, especially the de facto link between nationalism and patriotism.

Believing in the importance of moving toward de facto Arab forces, despite its especially outstanding ideological differences with them, the PFLP discussed religious movements in the Arab world, stressing the need to distinguish forces fighting Israel (Hizballah in Lebanon and the Hamas [Islamic Resistance] movement in the occupied territories) from other forces having different concerns. In this regard, the PFLP calls on national, Arab liberation

forces and fundamentalist forces to "eliminate the contradiction between nationalism and religion in order to face the facts and challenges of life."

The Fifth PFLP Congress can be summarized as a reading of the facts without self-resignation. The Fifth Congress restored organizational standing as a tactical aspect of the struggle, after the organizational problem experienced by its founder, martyr Dr. Wadi' Haddad, shortly before the convocation of the fourth congress.

#### **The Political Bureau**

The following are the announced names of the members of the new PFLP political bureau:

Dr. George Habash, secretary general (since 1967).

Abu-'Ali Mustafa, deputy secretary-general (since 1967).

'Abd-al-Rahim Malluh [?], a member of the PLO executive committee who resides in Jordan.

Abu-Ahmad Fu'ad, a military official residing in Damascus.

Sabir Muhyi-al-Din, a PFLP organizational official.

Taysir Qubba'ah, deputy chairman of the Palestine National Council.

'Umar (Qatish) (Lebanon).

Dr. Mahir al-Tahir (new).

Hasan Muhammad 'Ilyan (new).

Sa'id Salim (new).

In addition, there are five members in the occupied territories whose names were not announced.

The most prominent of the "deportees" were Salah Salah of the Lebanon branch, his wife Samirah Salah of the central committee, financial official Abu-'Abd-Yunus, and other elements of the Jordanian and Palestinian arenas.

#### **AL-HAYAH Analyzes PFLP Conference Results**

93WR0154Z London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
23 Feb 93 p 6

[Article by Husayn Hijazi: "PFLP Opts To Adhere to Tradition as Inlet to Rejuvenation and to Entrenching Its Role"]

[Text] Nicosia—Now that the PFLP's [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] fifth congress has completed its work, it has become possible to know the answers to questions about the direction of its option. The fact is that perhaps the strong inclination that characterizes the final formula and demonstrates a tendency toward "sternness" reveals, in the final analysis, the most realistic option. The main concern preoccupying Dr. George Habash, who has been leading the PFLP for more than two decades, is to seek distinction and to reaffirm the need to envelope his movement in steadfastness.

In this sense, those who had expected the "doctor" to go along with the prevalent tendency in Palestinian, even international, political thinking have been disappointed.

The PFLP has said again that Leninist Marxism is the "pilot and guide to action" and that the PFLP is not prepared to change its skin every time Russia disavows itself and commits suicide. Those who had expected the PFLP to reconsider its firm conventional position on the political settlement and the negotiations have been wrong. In this obstinate insistence, the character of which is not devoid of some heroism, the PFLP does not seek to persist in superciliousness, and it does not lack the virtue of admitting a mistake. The PFLP seeks first and foremost to preserve its role and its status, considering that it is the Palestinian political tendency that reflects most loyally and honestly the other current existing within the Palestinian public opinion. Rather, we should view all this inclination to underline this tendency as the option most compatible with the Palestinian political makeup.

Thus, while choosing to proceed according to its old tradition, the PFLP may be simultaneously introducing the only possible modification that assures this movement of the right to claim a *raison d'être*, legitimacy, and distinction. Ultimately, if Fatah represents the tendency to support the leadership's and state's legitimacy, if it reflects, with its makeup and its ideology, the centrist tendency of the Palestinian movement, and if Hamas is the rising opposition force that reflects the more refined and dynamic form of the Palestinian fundamentalist tendency, then the PFLP is the actual and more genuine spokesman that reflects the third tendency of the Palestinian national movement, namely, the secular leftist tendency without which the three sides of the triangle—a triangle constituting the formula of relations among the Palestinian forces—cannot be balanced or set aright.

Within this perspective, we should perhaps view the conclusions made by the PFLP's latest congress as the wisest and the soundest, not from the aspect of dictates of the partisan interest, which is embodied in securing continued legitimacy and the moral and political motives that are necessary to justify the plan, but from the aspect of dictates of the national interest, which is embodied in maintaining an internal balance of forces and a diversity of voices that are essential for restraint and for protecting the rules of the game from any deviation or flaw that leads to the loss of balance or of direction. This is because the main question in whatever pertains to this issue is not connected with evaluating how sound or faulty is the political or ideological option adopted by a given political movement or organization but with whether this option has legitimacy and support on the real ground.

Thus, time should not be devoted now to reassessing the tendency or its feasibility. It is left up to opinions and to politics to settle this matter. But it may be time to re-welcome the PFLP itself, which has actually demonstrated its worthiness by preserving its ability to survive and to distinguish itself with a political and intellectual role equal to those of others. As for the Palestinians, the conclusion that can be made is that the Palestinian political map is surprisingly constant. This constancy derives its strength from the fact that beyond Fatah, the PFLP, and Hamas, no Palestinian political force with a worthy plan

has come into existence. In this sense, one can perhaps finally view the history of the Palestinian left in its entirety as the history of splinters and branches stemming from the PFLP. But these splinters have never posed a challenge to the PFLP's position or role. If the latest congress has proven anything fundamental, then it is that the PFLP continues to hold its position as the firmest political bloc within the Palestinian left, that it is ultimately capable of representing and reflecting this tendency, and that it is premature to say that this tendency has lost its importance or role in the Palestinian movement.

What has happened at the PFLP's fifth congress is not the "doctor's" success in restoring sternness to his movement, but in rehabilitating its spirit. Without the spirit which has characterized this movement, it is difficult to talk about a balanced makeup. Perhaps, this reaffirmation is the highest form of rejuvenation, considering that self-denial can be at times tantamount to suicide or to resigning from the political game. The PFLP does not wish to depart from the game yet.

## BAHRAIN

### Real Estate Company Sells 500 Million Shares

93AE0283A London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT* in Arabic  
4 Jan 93 p 10

[Report from Manama by Khalil Ni'mat: "United Real Estate Company Launched, Capitalized at 50 Million Bahraini Dinars"]

[Text] A number of Bahraini businessmen are to meet today at the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry to discuss the launching of the United Real Estate Company, which is now being founded.

The company's stock will be offered for public subscription and will have an authorized capital of 50 million Bahraini dinars, which will be divided into 500 million shares with a par value of 100 fils. Paid capital is expected to amount to 10 million dinars.

The launching of this company will be the first in Bahrain in nine years. It will engage in various commercial investment operations inside and outside Bahrain, such as the purchase and ownership of land and real estate and the construction of buildings and real estate projects, as well as residential and office complexes and the investment of funds in financial papers, fixed assets, and other investment vehicles.

The company also will contract for building and construction industries related to its operations and will undertake economic, technical, and engineering studies and consultations that deal with real estate investment.

At the meeting, the businessmen will determine the company's authorized capital of 50 million Bahraini dinars, which will be divided into 500 million shares with a par value of 100 fils. Paid capital is 10 million Bahraini dinars, divided into 100 million shares with a par value of 100 fils.

Only the citizens of Bahrain can be company founders, and their shares will amount to a maximum of 20 to 40 percent

of the capital. Citizens of GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states will be allowed to subscribe to capital shares to the extent of 25 percent of capital.

All Bahraini public stock companies and certain Bahraini closed companies are expected to be invited to subscribe to shares valued at no less than 50,000 dinars. A group of 80 to 100 founders, individuals, and private institutions will also be invited to subscribe to shares with a minimum value of 25,000 dinars. Invitations to subscribe have also been sent to the General Authority for Social Security and the General Pension Fund Authority.

The founding of the company is supposed to be announced next May, after the completion of incorporation procedures, which will take six months.

It is common knowledge that the real estate sector realized handsome profits in 1992 and was one of the few sectors to be profitable that year. This, according to financial observers, has attracted the attention of investors.

The company will be the first company to be incorporated in 10 years.

## EGYPT

### Islamic Conference Makes Recommendations

93AF0363A Cairo *AKHIR SA'AH* in Arabic 27 Jan 93 p 10

[Article by Tihami Muntasir: "Cairo Declaration: Terrorism Condemned at Islamic Conference"]

[Text] The fifth general conference of the High Council on Islamic Affairs ended its proceedings with the Cairo declaration to the peoples of the world. The Muslim ulema condemned violence, terrorism, extremism, and unjustified killing. The conference participants recommended the speedy establishment of an Islamic court of justice and the formation of an Islamic deterrent force to carry out the court's rulings. The ulema called on all Muslims to respect their religion, avoid acts of violence and terrorism, and reacquaint themselves with Islam in order to revive Islamic communities, make the earth prosper, and make the face of life beautiful again. In its recommendations, which emanated from more than 180 ulema who represented more than 100 countries, the conference condemned all acts of violence and begged the international community to enable Muslim minorities to exercise their legitimate rights. The ulema recommended encouraging the investment of Islamic capital in the Islamic countries, calling on Muslim businessmen living abroad to establish branches of their firms in Islamic countries, providing a positive atmosphere and guarantees for them, and rapidly establishing an Islamic common market to confront the international challenges represented by political, military, and economic entities in Europe and America.

During the sessions of the conference, which began 19 January 1993 and lasted until 21 January, the ulema stressed their respect for the policy of President Mubarak and Egypt, particularly on issues of the Gulf war, the massacres of Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the

Palestinian deportees. On the second day of the conference, President Mubarak received all of the members of the conference and said that Egypt would always stand on the side of right and international legitimacy. President Mubarak told the Muslim ulema that Egypt, as a sovereign country, would accept pressure from no one and would pursue its policy according to its historical vanguard role in the region—not, as some claim, that "we follow a policy due to some camp here or there."

### Terrorism as They See It!

At the same session, the dean of the Islamic University in the United Kingdom (Britain), Dr. Muhammad Zaki Badawi, who is Egyptian by nationality, delivered a speech in which he affirmed that the Western media were biased, dealt unfairly with Muslim issues, and portrayed our countries as a hotbed of violence, terrorism, murder, and bloodshed, denying that we had any peace and security. These were distortions by the European and Western media.

### International Academy for Islamic Legal Rulings

Immediately after him, Dr. Yousef Kettani from Morocco spoke about how the halt of the movement of independent judgment in Islamic jurisprudence had caused weakness in the Arab mind. From a desire to solve problems and because the educated and intellectuals had withdrawn, the field had been left open to eventual terrorism and extremism. He called for creating an international Islamic academy for legal rulings whose decisions would be binding on Muslims, whatever their country and wherever they lived, since Muslims' conditions are similar, if not exactly the same.

Departing from the agenda, Dr. 'Abd-al-Sabur Shahin, professor at Dar al-'Ulum College, asked the chair for permission to speak. He raised the issue of how the Arabic language, the language of the Koran, has fallen behind; how Muslims, even in Muslim countries, neglect it and treat it as a fifth- or 10th-rate language; and how they promote foreign languages over it and prefer someone fluent in English, French, or German to someone fluent in Arabic.

### 'We Do Not Instigate Terrorism'

Half an hour before the conference ended, the Afghan minister of information, Mohammad Siddique Chakri, stood up and delivered a speech denying the presence of terrorist and extremist training camps. He said: "Our country does not tolerate such things. We have no interest in disrupting security and stability in any Arab or Islamic country. They stood beside us in our trial. The position of Egypt and President Mubarak is known to everyone. They extended us a helping hand with money, weapons, and men. Even those who did not extend their hands to us—we are not party to a quarrel with anyone. Our circumstances do not allow us to engage in training terrorists. I was startled when I read Egyptian newspapers and some other newspapers that lumped us with Iran and Sudan as countries that encourage terrorism and extremism. I state that

this false charge does not apply to a people still suffering after their bitter jihad from fights and disagreements among fellow mujahidin."

Chakri continued: "Yes, we used to train Muslim mujahidin who came to us from all the countries of the world to defend Islam and their fellow Muslims. We opened our borders to everyone to give Muslim youths the chance to participate in the holy duty of jihad against the Russian imperialist. Only then did we train youths in weapons and fighting; after the war ended and we entered Kabul, the brethren left of their own accord and returned to their lands. We have no official or unofficial contact with them. Whenever any of these youths is arrested, he is asked where he received training and says that it was in Afghanistan. Naturally, that was during the fighting. Then the media go into action and accuse us falsely."

### Tears at the Conference

Dr. Salih (Colakovic), mufti of Bosnia-Hercegovina and head of the Association of Senior Ulema, was able to draw the attention of all the conferees when he spoke with impassioned feeling and heavy tears welling from his eyes about the savagery of Serbs in killing Muslims and raping women and girls. When he mentioned how Serbian soldiers had forced a girl to have sex with an animal, the words stuck in his throat amid sighs and tears from some of the audience and signs of grief covering virtually every face. Dr. (Colakovic) said: "The problem begins because Europe hates Islam and gets its idea about Islam from the reports that news agencies publish and broadcast in the odious West and its newspapers. These reports blacken the image of Islam and besmirch it falsely and deceitfully with blood, violence, and terrorism. The disgraceful position of the UN secretary general, Dr. Boutros Ghali, who has turned his back on our cause and busied himself with much less important issues, has increased the bitterness in our minds. He has approved another strike against Iraq, but has refrained from intervening to protect the lives of Muslims who are being slaughtered night and day in a primarily religious war. They hate Islam and Muslims." Dr. (Colakovic) called on the Islamic community to adopt a unified position before it is too late against attempts to partition the Muslim republic, where Muslims make up over 70 percent of the population.

After this speech, the conference concluded its proceedings and adjourned. It was announced that Friday prayers would be held the next day at al-Azhar Mosque, and the members went out to await the conference's recommendations. Those who participated in formulating them included: Dr. 'Abd-al-Sabur Marzuq, general secretary of the High Council for Islamic Affairs and the conference's secretary general; Dr. Sufi Abu-Talib; Dr. Ahmad Haykal; Ahmad Farraj; and Shaykh 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi, the Saudi minister of pilgrimage and religious trusts. The Saudi minister asked for a modification of the recommendation on Iraq and almost left the drafting room at the hotel and the conference to return home when he read the conference's recommendation strongly disapproving of the aggression against Iraq's people, installations, capacities, and infrastructure and that Saddam Husayn must abide by

and obey the resolutions of the United Nations and the international community. The Saudi minister changed his mind about withdrawing after Dr. Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub intervened and the recommendation was changed to strongly condemn Iraq and reject condemnation of America and the international community for approving the strike against Iraq. The full recommendations came out as follows:

1. Abiding by the precepts, values, and constants of Islam; reviewing the laws in force in the Islamic countries to make them harmonize with the provisions of Islamic law.
2. Coordinating and integrating organizations and associations for Islamic missionary work and guidance. Missionary work should take its point of departure from the Koranic words: "Call to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and good admonition, and dispute with them in the best way possible" [Koran 16:125].
3. Settling disputes by peaceful means in light of the Koranic words: "If two groups of believers come to fight one another, promote peace between them. Then, if one of them turns aggressive against the other, fight against the aggressive party till it reverts to God's commandment. If it does so, make peace among them equitably, and be impartial. Surely God loves the just" [Koran 49:9]. In affirmation of this idea, the conference advises Islamic countries to respect the rights of neighbors among the Islamic countries and not to intervene in another country's internal affairs to promote ideas or to propagate or impose a particular ideology by force. There should be speedy implementation of the resolution of the 19th conference of foreign ministers of Islamic countries calling for establishing an Islamic court of justice, and defense forces should be formed from the member states of the Islamic Conference Organization to implement the rulings of the Islamic court of justice.
4. Cultural, educational, scientific, technological, and informational cooperation; preserving Islamic values and principles and the elements of Islamic culture, especially language and law, so that Arabic, the language of the Koran, will be the tool of expression for all branches of knowledge, as far as possible.
5. Economic cooperation; speedy formation of the Islamic common market; studying the Islamic community's resources so as to take advantage of them to develop the Islamic societies and improve their members.
6. The problem of Muslim minorities: The conference appealed to the governments of the peoples of the Islamic world to stand beside the Islamic states that recently became independent after the collapse of communism, to guarantee protection of their territories, unity, and creed. The conference recommended that the secretariat of the High Council for Islamic Affairs in Cairo cooperate with the Islamic Conference Organization and the Arab League to form one or more committees to conciliate conflicting and fighting forces within some Islamic countries and defend the interests of Muslim minorities abroad.

The recommendations and the Cairo declaration were read by the secretary general of the conference and the High Council for Islamic Affairs, Professor Dr. 'Abd-al-Sabur Marzuq.

## IRAQ

### Minister Stresses Legal Permit for Arrest

93AE0347A Baghdad AL-IRAQ in Arabic 12 Jan 93 p 2

[Text] Baghdad—Interior Minister Watban Ibrahim al-Hasan asserted that arbitrary arrest measures do not exist in Iraq. He said no citizen under suspicion can be arrested without an official permit and in accordance with the law.

In an interview with AL-IRAQ, which touched on various aspects of security responsibility and the citizens' ties with the various security departments, he said the ministry has limited the period of investigation of suspects to one week. In case legal investigative procedures require extending detention period, the governor concerned should obtain the minister of interior's approval of that.

The minister stressed that no one in any position in the ministry of interior has the power to detain any person. The legal powers to detain any citizen under suspicion for investigation in connection with any case rests strictly with the minister of interior.

Regarding the distrust between the citizen and the internal security services, Watban Ibrahim al-Hasan said this was due to the unclear instructions that facilitate the implementation of the law. The clearer, the easier, and the better the instructions are understood by the security organs and the citizens the stronger mutual trust becomes. He said that some security organs lacked correct understanding of how to deal with the citizen, to preserve his dignity, to maintain the secrecy of the information he provides, and to protect him against falling foul with the law. For this reason the Interior Ministry has prepared clear guidelines for security leaders in the field regarding the manner of dealing with citizens and has stressed the accountability of those who operate beyond these guidelines. He said that the ministry of interior is very anxious to see that relations between its departments and the citizens are at their best in terms of trust, interaction, and realizing the security of the community.

The minister has expressed personal interest in seeing that the human factor is present when the interior security departments deal with citizens, and even with criminals who have been sentenced by the courts. He expressed the belief that taking the human factor into consideration constitutes a solid base for building mutual trust between the Interior Ministry and the masses. Without realizing mutual trust, success and ambitions cannot be realized.

AL-IRAQ will publish text of this dialogue with the interior minister next Thursday.

## ISRAEL

**EC, U.S. Competition for Middle East Market**  
*93AF0380A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Feb 93 p B1*

[Article by Yehudit Winkler]

[Text]

### Europe Is a World Power, Too

In the last hours of the talks between Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres and the Council for Cooperation between Israel and the European Community, which was held in Brussels at the beginning of the week simultaneously with the EC's Conference of Foreign Ministers, the two sides expressed their ideas about the future of relations between the EC, Israel, and the Palestinians.

Peres has been accused more than once, both by the Likud and by his rivals in the Labor Party, of crossing the line and adopting a dovish view when mapping out the geopolitical and geoeconomic future of the region. They have repeatedly laughed at his suggestions for setting up regional economic cooperation with the Arab states and Palestinians, to be based on a formula similar to that of the Common Market, and have complained that he was pulling from his sleeve fantastic ideas that were really meant just to make headlines.

It turns out that these ideas were well-received this week in Brussels, which wants to escape from its status as passive observer. For Peres, the "Conference of European Foreign Ministers" in Brussels was well-timed to allow him to bring up those ideas on tripartite economic cooperation between Europe, Israel, and the Arab World and Palestinians that he has been fostering so long. He arrived in Brussels well-prepared to face a harsh attack on Israel over the expulsions, and he presented his ideas on regional cooperation as part of Israel's openness to the changing world, a formula that speaks to European hearts.

At the opening of the debate, Peres expressed Israel's desire to work for a "historic reconciliation with the Palestinian people" in the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation or a tripartite Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli confederation. He emphasized the importance—as a first step—of free elections for Palestinian leadership and institutions, which he said could be held within a few months, and he gave assurances that Jerusalem will respond to moderation with moderation.

Particularly sweet to European ears was the introduction to the economic-political section of the Israeli position—for, considering the EC's own efforts to expand its membership and to someday include the former eastern bloc as well, a call from Jerusalem to work toward regional economic unification and regional cooperation in the Near East sounds logical and inevitable.

At the same time, Europe is following with concern what is happening in the new bloc of Muslim states on her southeastern border, with Iran as its axis, and feels that the Near

East is getting closer and closer to her, and that it is no longer a case of one more crisis-ridden region at the ends of the earth.

Until now, Europe's economic involvement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was limited, and came up against indifference or opposition from important entrepreneurs. Israel, too, particularly during the years of Likud rule, did not look favorably on involvement by the EC in what was happening under Jerusalem's nose, and relations with the EC's representatives in Jerusalem were often on the verge of a breakup. The International Federation of Trade Unions promised to work energetically to attract entrepreneurs to the territories to lay the foundation for future development, but has actually done very little.

On the other hand, the EC heaped obstacles on the expansion of Israeli citrus exports to her, as long as Israel held fast to her refusal to allow Palestinian citrus growers to set up an independent marketing network for export to the continent. Exhausting talks in Brussels ended at last in a compromise that allows the Palestinians to export to Europe independently, in coordination with Israeli marketing groups.

A working paper that the Israeli delegation in Brussels prepared for the talks with the European leaders says that with the EC's new orientation toward developing the Mediterranean countries, many new possibilities have opened up for regional cooperation in the realms of irrigation, pest control, curbing desertification, fishing, and afforestation.

In this context, Peres brought up an urgent need: that the prohibition of surrendering to the Arab boycott be anchored to a pan-European treaty, rather than Israel negotiating with each country separately.

It will not be until May, for example, that the German Bundestag adopts the expected bill forbidding capitulation to the boycott, though the bill was supposed to go into effect several months ago. The delay, they explain in Bonn, stems from the need to allow German entrepreneurs to finish preparations for commitments [already made] in the Arab world, because billions of marks in investment could be lost if the time extension is not given.

Peres was prepared to face an EC attack on Israel over the expulsion of the Hamas activists, and to attempt to do his best to keep the episode from holding up the negotiations on updating trade agreements between the EC and Israel; and Helvig Petersen, the EC's acting president, did lay a serious indictment on the Israel delegation's desk.

Jerusalem read the map correctly: the episode of the expulsions would delay the Israeli-European dialogue. But going beyond the crisis of the moment, Petersen raised proposals, just as Peres did, for regional economic cooperation in the Near East.

Peres barely rescued the talks with the EC from failure in the very first moments of the debate, after he was told of the government's decision in the case of the Hamas expulsions. Nobody present deluded himself that Europe could become an equal partner with the United States in the

peace process, but Jerusalem gave clear signs that, because of vital economic and political interests, it would see greater European involvement in Near East events as a real contribution toward creating a healthy climate for dialogue with the Arab World.

The talks in Brussels created new opportunities and it will be possible to make the most of them—if Peres's thesis was not just a one-time move meant to soften the EC with the time coming up for updating trade agreements, but rather part of a long-term strategy that testifies to the fact that the Rabin government has adopted a new global viewpoint that includes a serious role for Europe alongside the United States.

#### **Background on UNRWA in Territories**

*93AA0002A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
7 Mar 93 p 2*

[Text] There are about 8,000 UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] personnel working in the territories, about 40 of whom are foreign employees. The main branches of the organization in Jerusalem and Gaza are directed by foreign nationals. According to agreements between UNRWA and the Civil Administration [Civad], the agency is supposed to assist residents of the refugee camps in the territories in the provision of food and clothing, and to deal in the treatment of distress connected to daily life in the camps.

Since the beginning of the intifada, UNRWA personnel have also been involved in aid to Palestinians who are not residents of the refugee camps, effectively deviating from the mandate given to them by agreement with the Israel Defense Forces [IDF]. In 1989, there were multiple complaints by IDF commanders and Civad personnel against foreign and Palestinian UNRWA employees; they charged that the latter interfered in the work of IDF soldiers.

In recent years, the agency has established teams—whose members are mainly Palestinians—that have monitored IDF activity in the refugee camps and large cities in the territories, and reported on instances in which, in their opinion, human rights have been violated. A senior military figure said that "we have had severe difficulties with them. There have been instances where UNRWA teams have told Palestinians that IDF forces were about to arrive at a given place."

The same figure said: "They have complained about this in the past. Meetings were conducted between the heads of UNRWA and Civad personnel and it was promised that UNRWA personnel would halt such activity, but they continue to act accordingly today."

Further tension between the IDF and UNRWA has arisen because the local UNRWA branches in Rafi'ah, Jabalya, Ramallah, Janin, and Hebron have employed Palestinians who were once imprisoned in Israel due to involvement in terrorist activity. More than once, soldiers have entered UNRWA branches and arrested persons suspected of hostile activity who worked in the UNRWA offices.

"This is the only place in the world where a supposedly objective organization hires local residents. It is only natural that these same Palestinians should work for the good of their people and that their reports should not be objective," said the senior figure. Three years ago a serious incident occurred between soldiers and UNRWA personnel. An IDF officer entered UNRWA offices in the Rafi'ah area, conducted an on-site search and confiscated documents—on suspicion that wanted persons were concealed there. The agency strongly protested the action.

The IDF has complained about the fact that UNRWA does not report to the Civad about wounded residents who receive treatment at UNRWA clinics. There was also a complaint about the fact that agency employees tend to position their vehicles between soldiers and rock-throwers—in order to prevent the soldiers from apprehending the rock-throwers.

The Civad says that, recently, the network of contacts between UNRWA and the Israeli authorities has been more or less reasonable, but the last incident in Rafi'ah will again cloud relations.

#### **KUWAIT**

##### **Foreign Minister on Somalia Force**

*93AE0374C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
2 Mar 93 p 6*

[Article by Mahbub al-'Abdallah: "Kuwait Is Committed to Damascus Proclamation and Its Peace Forces Will Stay in Somalia"]

[Text] Kuwait—Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, Kuwait's first deputy prime minister and foreign minister, has emphasized that the Kuwaiti peace force present in Somalia currently will stay there to complete the missions for which it was dispatched in the first place.

In a statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT yesterday, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad said that the Kuwaiti force performs its role under the UN flag to help the fraternal Somali people overcome their problems. He pointed out that the Kuwaiti force's participation is tantamount to returning a favor to international legitimacy, the United Nations, and the alliance countries that took part in defeating the Iraqi aggressors during Kuwait's ordeal.

In a related development, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad underlined the profound ties that unite Kuwait and the GCC states. He also underlined his country's commitment to the Damascus proclamation, asserting that the security accords Kuwait has signed with friendly countries are not in conflict with the principles of this proclamation.

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad also discussed his latest tour of nine Arab countries, in addition to Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and India, saying that it sought to explain the latest developments in the region and Kuwait's position toward them. Referring to the Iraqi opposition, he asserted that Kuwait does not interfere in Iraq's domestic affairs and that it supports Iraq's territorial integrity.

Regarding the visit made by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Kuwait recently as part of his tour which included a number of Middle East countries, Shaykh Sabah said that the U.S. secretary stressed in his talks with high-ranking Kuwaiti officials that the new U.S. administration, led by President Bill Clinton, supports Kuwait and will stand with it against any possible future aggression.

### **Government Calls for OPEC Harmony**

*93AE0374B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic*  
27 Feb 93 p 12

[Article: "AL-SHAL Economic Report: Kuwait Urged To Adhere to OPEC Resolutions"]

[Text] Kuwait—AL-SHAL, a weekly economic report, has urged the Kuwaiti Government to adhere to what was agreed at the latest OPEC meeting in order to subject the members' promises to a new test at the next meeting.

The following is the text of the report:

#### 1. Oil:

Oil production in Kuwait amounted to nearly 1.867 bpd [barrels per day] by the middle of last week, after it had risen to nearly 1.931 million bpd at the beginning of last week, thus registering record production for the post-liberation period. Kuwait's production from the fields in the shared zone amounted to nearly 161,000 barrels [daily] and its share from al-Wafrah field amounted to 43,000 barrels. Its total production inside Kuwait and in the shared zone amounted to 2.071 million bpd, rising by nearly 97,000 barrels daily over the average daily production of the preceding week. There was no change in the number of operational collection terminals (17) or in the volume diverted for refining, which continues to stand at 425,000 bpd. Meanwhile, the number of producing wells has risen to 600, increasing by nine wells over the number on the preceding Sunday.

Kuwait feels that it has been done an injustice by the position taken toward it at OPEC's latest meetings. It seems that this time Kuwait has been the target of pressures. The oil minister met with the National Assembly's Finance and Economy Committee at the end of last week at the committee's request to clarify the conditions and circumstances surrounding the OPEC meetings. Kuwait has been promised by its partners in OPEC that it will be given a concession for a large increase in its quota during the third quarter of this year to put it on an equal footing with similar countries. A Kuwaiti oil source has asserted that Kuwait will abide by its new quota as of next March but that it will be the second country to exceed this quota if any other country does so first and that it expects its OPEC partners to fulfill their promises to reinstate at the next meeting a quota compatible with its position. Otherwise, Kuwait will take a different stance. We believe that it is essential for Kuwait to adhere to what has been agreed to and that it subject OPEC's promises to a new test at the next meeting.

#### 2. Foreign investments:

For the second time, a Spanish magistrate has rejected a criminal lawsuit filed by Kuwait against the former management of the Torres Group for procedural considerations, including the fact that the company is beyond his jurisdiction and protection and because documents are lacking. This is considered a psychological victory for the management. But it is not believed that this feeling will last long, because there is enough evidence to alter the course of the case.

Some people in Kuwait believe that it is enough that one side knows the details of the investments issue. Perhaps these people would be right if the case were an ordinary one. But the fact is that it is not ordinary, considering the dimensions of the case, the confidential manner in which it has been handled for a long time, and the lack of record books and documents and of administrative and organizational bylaws and structures. This is why we believe that numerous specialists with varied opinions are required to analyze the data so that they can attain the minimum capability to determine past responsibilities and to set up a future administrative and control system. Therefore, we see no contradiction between the general prosecution's efforts to cover the criminal dimension, the Accounting Bureau's efforts to cover the financial control aspect, and the [parliamentary] Finance and Economy Committee's efforts to cover the political aspect. For technical reasons, and for political reasons concerning others, we believe that it is necessary to merge efforts and to coordinate them with the current government efforts. Perhaps a unified team can confront the other team, i.e., the old management team, which was capable, by virtue of interest, influence, and financial capabilities, of creating a front that infiltrated major information and political agencies in the past and that will try to do the same in the future.

#### 3. Kuwait's securities market:

Last week, performance of the Kuwait Securities Market was generally weak, and this weakness was reflected in its main indicators. The number of registered companies is still 39, and the number of companies with circulated stocks is 37. At the end of the business day last Wednesday, AL-SHAL indicator read 86.2 points, dropping 0.4 points from the preceding week and 13.8 points from 1 August 1990. Compared with their value on 1 August 1990, the shares of 10 companies rose, and the shares of 25 companies dropped, with the stock of two companies remaining unchanged.

The total number of traded shares was 5.68 million, with an average daily circulation of 1.14 million and a drop of 44.3 percent from the preceding week. The total value of traded shares amounted to 1.91 million Kuwaiti dinars, with an average daily value of 382,000 Kuwaiti dinars and a drop of 5.7 percent. A total of 194 transactions were concluded, with an average of 39 transactions daily and a drop of nearly 42.6 percent. The National Bank of Kuwait shares led all trading, constituting 26.9 percent of the traded volume and 72.5 percent of the value. It was followed by the Gulf Bank, with 19 percent of the volume and 9.5 percent of the value, and by the National Bank, with 8.1 percent of the volume and 3.1 percent of the

value. The banking sector had a 65.3 percent share of the volume and a 91.1 percent share of the value.

**Assembly Discusses Internal, External Security**  
*93AE0374D London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic*  
*2 Mar 93 p 6*

[Article by Nasir al-Mutayri: "In What May Be Closed Session Attended by Interior and Defense Minister, Kuwaiti National Assembly Opens Today Internal and External Security File"]

[Text] Kuwait—In its session today, Kuwait's National Assembly will discuss the internal and external security file, after having postponed the discussion on this issue repeatedly. Interior Minister Shaykh Ahmad al-Hamud al-Jabir al-Sabah is scheduled to attend the session and answer the Assembly members' questions on mainstays of internal security and on preparations made by the ministry in case any emergency develops. The session will also be attended by Defense Minister Shaykh 'Ali Salim al-Sabah who will answer questions about the condition of the Kuwaiti armed forces and the Defense Ministry's plan to confront any danger that threatens Kuwait's security and safety.

Parliamentary sources have told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that a number of deputies will demand that the session be made a closed session because of the sensitive nature of these topic and their ramifications to the security situation.

It is expected that Assembly members will also discuss the tragedy of the floodwaters that swept the town of al-Jahrah and caused heavy losses. The Asembly is expected to discuss the question of how the victims will be compensated. Moreover, the Health, Social, and Labor Affairs Committee agreed yesterday to disburse compensation and allowances to Kuwaiti physicians in the United States and Canada. Deputy Ahmad al-Kulayb, chairman of the National Assembly's Health Committee, has told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that it has been agreed to disburse to these physicians a sum of just 500 dinars monthly and that the sum of 300 dinars allocated for them as a housing allowance in a previous resolution has not been added to the sum to be disbursed.

In a related development, the Health, Social, and Labor Affairs Committee reviewed yesterday the Kuwaiti Government's health, social and labor affairs program, which has been referred to the National Assembly for its opinion. The committee decided to assign Deputy Ahmad Baqir, its rapporteur and the National Assembly secretary, to draft the response to the program. The committee will hold its next meeting with the National Medical Professions Union to discuss numerous complaints received from workers in private clinics.

**Assembly Discusses Security, Defense**  
*93AE0374A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic*  
*27 Mar 93 p 6*

[Article: "Kuwait: Parliament Discusses Security and Defense Policy on Tuesday"]

[Text] Kuwait—Kuwait's National Assembly (parliament) will discuss the security and defense policy next Tuesday. This discussion has been postponed five times for several reasons, including the travel of Interior Minister Shaykh Ahmad al-Hamud or his failure to attend parliamentary sessions.

Assembly Speaker Ahmad al-Sa'dun has criticized the interior minister for his departure from the assembly hall without permission during the previous session even though he knew the security issue was to be discussed at the session.

Opinions still vary on whether the parliament's next session should be closed or open. The majority sees that it should be closed, considering that Kuwaiti security agencies have been the subject of ample criticism in most sessions.

But the assault on these agencies has been diminishing recently now that the interior minister has been able to win a number of deputies over to his side by seeing to a deluge of requests that they have been receiving from citizens and that can be settled only by the minister's direct intervention.

It is to be noted that the minister has embraced the policy of making decisions independently since Kuwait was liberated and that he has been justifying this policy by the lawlessness in the security situation. Moreover, the powers of a number of agency directors have been tied to the minister directly.

It is unlikely that Tuesday's session will culminate in any resolutions. But the statement that will be read by the interior minister will be referred to the Interior and Defense Committee to assess and evaluate it and then return it revised, with recommendations to dissolve some security agencies and introduce changes in their leadership positions.

Moreover, parliamentary sources have assured AL-HAYAH that the resignation of Major General Jabir al-Khalid al-Sabah, Kuwaiti chief of staff, has become a fait accompli. This is what is demanded by the legislative authority, which has been urging fundamental changes in the army command.

**Prisoners and Cemeteries**

In another area, Shaykh Salim al-Sabah, chairman of the National Committee for Kuwaiti Prisoners of War Affairs, has revealed that the committee plans to look for "mass graves" dating back to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

In press statements, al-Sabah pointed out that available data confirm the presence of such graves in different parts of Kuwait, noting that it is possible that NASA satellites will be used to spot the graves. It should be noted that 850 Kuwaiti prisoners are still missing.

Some witnesses have visited the committee offices and expressed their willingness to lead officials to mass graves in southern Kuwait. The committee chairman expects that steps will be launched to find the graves this week.

Shaykh Salim al-Sabah had suspended his activity after a parliamentary demand had been made to dissolve the committee which was accused of failing to prepare prisoners' files and to cooperate with international organizations. The National Assembly and some cabinet members voted to dissolve the committee but Prime Minister and Crown Prince Shaykh Sa'd al-Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah suspended the recommendation.

## QATAR

### Mobil, QGPC Sign Production, Marketing Agreement

[Article: "Qatar General Petroleum Company and Mobil Sign New Agreement"]

[Text] Mobil Oil Company sources told AL-HAYAH that the company has signed a new joint agreement with the Qatar General Petroleum Company [QGPC] for the production and marketing of 10 million tons of liquefied natural gas [LNG] annually from the North Field.

In a press statement, which AL-HAYAH obtained a copy of, Mobil said that as a result of the agreement, it will own 30 percent of the new project, which has been called the "Ra's Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Company." On the other hand, QNGC will own 70 percent of the project.

Agreement between the two parties was achieved following a preliminary agreement that was reached last August. That agreement called for Mobil's participation in Qatari gas projects, among them the Qatargas [Qatar Liquefied Gas Company] project at a share of 10 percent, in addition to the new joint project. Gas industry sources estimate that Mobil will invest approximately \$3 billion in the two projects and their required tankers.

The press release contained a statement by Qatari Minister of Energy 'Abdallah Bin-Hamad al-Atiyah's that said that the Ra's Laffan joint project was a giant step on the road to development of the North Field reserves. The minister added that demand for LNG in the Far East, which currently amounts to 40 million tons annually, will increase to 50 million tons annually by the end of the decade. He expects that Qatar will play a significant role in providing clean fuels to developing markets.

The chairman of Mobil Oil said in the statement that his company was very pleased with the progress achieved in developing this important source of energy for international markets, specifying that the agreement takes into consideration the U.S. company's experience in developing natural gas projects and the processing of liquefied gas, in addition to its marketing capabilities.

The new joint project between Mobil and QGPC is the second major partnership for the U.S. company involving natural gas production in the Middle East. Moreover, the company owns numerous projects in Europe, the United States, and Asia, especially in Indonesia.

QGPC owns 70 percent of Qatargas, while Total (a French company), Marubeni, and Mitsui (two Japanese companies) each own 10 percent. In its first stage, the project

aims at servicing an agreement signed by Qatargas on 13 May of last year with Shobo, a Japanese electricity company, to sell North Field gas beginning in 1997 at a rate of 4 million tons per year for 25 years, with the option of increasing the amount by 2 million tons per year.

Total is involved in talks with Mobil on the latter's purchase of a 10 percent share of production in the Qatargas Project, out of the French company's share of 35 percent. Thus the U.S. company would own a 10 percent share of production, a percentage identical to its share of manufacturing and marketing operations within the project.

Mobil's statement said that the Ra's Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Company's project will be situated in a new industrial complex at Ra's Laffan and that it includes the Qatargas project.

Preliminary estimates of the two projects (Qatargas and the new joint project) indicate that cost, including tankers, will top \$18 billion, a fact that will place Qatar as one of the most important LNG producers in the world.

The North Field, one of the largest gas fields in the world—by some estimates, the very largest—contains an underground supply that is estimated at 500 trillion cubic feet of gas. Most of the reserves are found in one location, which will facilitate development. Moreover, the area is close to the Far East and Europe, which will form the gas projects' main markets.

In early June of last year, QGPC signed an agreement with a number of international companies to produce 6 million cubic meters of gas per year out of the North Field. QGPC will own a 65 percent share of the project, while the Italian company Snamprogetti will own 30 percent, and the American Hunt Company will own 5 percent.

Also, Qatargas announced in early July of last year that it had signed an agreement with the French company Elf Aquitaine and the Japanese Sumitomo Trading Company for a study of the economic feasibility of a project costing \$5 billion for the annual production of 4 million tons of liquefied gas from the North Field.

## SUDAN

### More Arrests by Security Forces Reported

93AF0362C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
4 Jan 93 p 4

[Article: "Arrests in Khartoum"]

[Text] London—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that Sudanese security forces made arrested dozens of persons in Khartoum last week, including Faruq 'Ali Zakariya, 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Ali Bashir, Muhammad Wahbah (a dismissed Irrigation Ministry official), 'Abd-al-Rauf 'Ali Bin-'Awad (a dismissed youth official), Muhammad Bashir (a Sudan Hotel official), Salah (Sam'arit) (a private company official), and 'Abd-al-Wahhab Ibrahim.

No information was available about where they were being detained. Some sources said they have been taken to "ghost houses" [torture chambers] and are being tortured.

**Al-Turabi's Statements to REUTERS Explained**  
*93AF0362A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 19 Jan 93 p 8*

[Article by Muhammad Jamal 'Arafah: "AL-SHA'B Publishes Details of New Political System in Sudan"]

[Text] The "distorted" statements that REUTERS has published in the name of Dr. Hasan al-Turabi about the imminent stepping aside of the Sudanese Revolutionary Command Council have aroused a great uproar in domestic and foreign political circles.

Although al-Turabi has issued a communique stating that REUTERS distorted his statements as part of a plot against Sudan and Islam and that the Revolutionary Council, which is no longer anything but a symbol of sovereignty, will remain until the end of its term as a symbol of the revolution, a protector of constitutional authority, and a guardian of political development in the country. The statement said that there is great ignorance about political developments in Sudan.

It is not true that the Salvation Revolution destroyed the experiment with political pluralism in Sudan and made do with military rule. Rather, the truth is that the revolution developed a new political system, called "the system of conferences," suitable to ruling Sudan with the participation of all sects and groups and without fear of new military coups. The development of this system was the reason behind the talk about the end of the role of the Revolutionary Command Council. How did this happen?

**597 Tribes in Sudan**

Sudanese statistics indicate that Sudan contains 597 tribes, which form 56 tribal groups, not counting a number of sects, races, and religions. Perhaps the most important of them on the political scene from independence to the present have been the Khatmiyah and Ansar sects.

Sudanese intellectuals have attributed the instability of the country's political situation and the occurrence of four successive military coups to this tribal and sectarian diversity and to the control of political life by the Ummah and Unionist parties (fronts for the Ansar and Khatmiyah sects respectively). Political life has continually witnessed numerous crises because of a conflict of interests between the Ansar and the Khatmiyah. These conflicts have been camouflaged behind the party system. The conflicts ended each time by paralyzing political and economic life and with army intervention in military coups such as occurred in 1956, 1964, 1968, and 1985.

Many Sudanese researchers and academics have concluded that Sudan's social and sectarian diversity forms a great obstacle to the success of a Western-style multiparty system in Sudan. Therefore, they have proposed two things:

- First, Sudan should adopt the federal form of government to overcome its racial and tribal diversity, particularly between North and South.

- Second, a new political system should be formed for a government that suits Sudan's conditions. This system should avoid a multiplicity of political parties and should be as far as possible from totalitarianism, a single-party system, and a military government, all of which have proved to be failures in Sudan.

**Conferences System**

A national conference on the desired new political system was in fact held from 6 August to 21 October 1990 and brought together 800 Sudanese who represented a majority of the political, racial, and tribal groups from North and South. Visits were made to Switzerland, America, Turkey, and dozens of other countries to learn from their political experience. A new system was agreed upon—the system of conferences—in addition to federal government. The following were the most important recommendations of the conference:


- That a presidential form of government, with the president directly elected by the people, should be adopted.
- That a system of conferences should be adopted.
- That there should be a single federal legislative body (parliament), the members of which should be elected on the basis of the population density of each of Sudan's six states; proportions should be set for all groups with weight in society. (This, in fact, is what happened with the appointment of a provisional parliament in which the proportions of each group were carefully set.)

**Army To Share in Governing**

One of the most important features that the new system of conferences establishes, as shown in the diagram, is that the so-called "modern forces"—young people, women, government employees, diplomats, and economists—will be given an opportunity to participate in governing. More importantly, the Army and the police will be given an opportunity to participate officially in this system—meaning that a proportion will be set for Army and police representatives in the federal parliament. Such Army participation doubtlessly represents a compromise to avoid the mistakes and shortcomings of previous political experiments, which swung between giving the Army full power under totalitarianism or completely banishing it under a multiparty system.

As for the structures of the political system, they will consist of the base conference, the council conference, the governorate conference, the state conference, and the national conference. Each conference will form a parallel parliament or council to issue resolutions.

The base conference will consist of the residents of each village or neighborhood aged 18 or over. They will meet in a general conference and choose from among themselves a council that consists of a chairman and a secretariat that will be in charge of issuing resolutions concerning the neighborhood or village.



NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM IN SUDAN

According to Sudanese statistics, there were 10,000 such base conferences in June 1992 throughout Sudan as a whole. From each of these conferences, a people's committee was elected to implement the base conference's resolutions. Significantly, these conferences were not limited to the northern states, but were also held in the southern states—in Upper Nile region, the Central state, and Kordofan—where 227 foundational conferences were held.

The next conference (the council conference) is composed of members sent up from the base conferences by election. Each conference elects a parallel legislative council corresponding to the municipal councils.

Upward elections continue in this way to the levels of governorate council, state council, and finally the national council or federal parliament.

It should be noted that elected quotas of the aforementioned modern forces participate both in the six state parliaments and in the federal parliament, thereby guaranteeing representation of all political, social, and racial forces. In other words, the elected federal parliament will be the result of general elections, plus elections for the eight sectors—the Army, youth, women, economists, legislators, social workers, diplomats, and managers. For example, the economic sector will include all associations, societies, and organizations registered as having economic activity. Together, [these sectors] will form 25 percent of the representation in parliament.

The second phase, the council conference level, began during June 1992. Some states have begun the third phase. All of these steps are expected to be completed next year, 1994, or early in 1995, according to conditions in each state, so that a federal national assembly can be elected to replace the present appointed parliament. Similar developments are expected at the executive and state government level in order to implement a federal government and accelerate the steps of this new political system.

#### **Opposition Participates**

Participation by major opposition political forces, supporters of the dissolved former political parties, occurred in the elections that took place at the first level (base) and the second level (council). Some of them actually won in a number of constituencies. This happened in Port Sudan (17 constituencies). Some Numayri supporters won in neighborhoods of Revolution City in Omdurman.

In other words, the new political system in Sudan began in 1990, despite the circumstances of the southern war, the hostile international environment, and the economic blockade.

The transitional National Assembly (the temporary parliament) is expected to establish the new federal constitution.

#### **What Does al-Turabi Mean?**

If the transitional parliament has already assumed the legislative powers of the Revolutionary Command Council (after the dissolution of the political, economic, and information committees in the Revolutionary Council) and the

cabinet has assumed the executive power, which has also been withdrawn from the Revolutionary Council, there remains nothing of the council except its being a symbol of the sovereignty of the state. Therefore, what al-Turabi said about the imminent dissolution of the council merely reiterated a well-known fact: namely, that the council will soon dissolve itself, as soon as the president of the Republic is elected, even temporarily, by parliament. The problem is that REUTERS intentionally published al-Turabi's statements—as he has affirmed—to make it appear as if he were the absolute master and as if he were the one setting the time for the council to be dissolved. This is what has not happened, as al-Turabi affirmed when he said that he did not intend to run for any official post. He did this to cut off any suspicions circulating about his running for the presidency.

#### **No Reconciliation Seen by Opposition Leaders**

*93AF0359A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic  
15 Jan 93 pp 22-24*

[Article by Majdi al-Daqqaq: "Sudanese Opposition Leaders to AL-MUSAWWAR: No Dialogue and No Reconciliation With Front Government"]

[Text] Since the Islamic Front seized power in wake of the 30 June 1989 military coup, the Sudanese National Democratic Grouping [SNDG] leaders have begun concerted consultations to declare the first "provisional government."

The consultations by the SNDG, which represents all of the Sudanese opposition forces at home and abroad and which includes 11 political parties and 51 labor and professional unions, the legitimate command of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Sudan, and a number of independent national figures—these consultations crown the Sudanese people's struggle against the military band imposed by the Islamic Front, which is led by al-Turabi, on the people. The consultations also come in wake of the SNDG's approval of a unified version of the charter to which the provisional government will adhere.

The SNDG leaders have assured AL-MUSAWWAR that the Bashir-al-Turabi regime is experiencing internal and external isolation and that this is why it has intensified its oppression campaigns against Sudan's citizens and why it is creating fabricated crises with Egypt to conceal its political and economic failure. They have affirmed their rejection of the maneuvers of the front's regime in urging reconciliation.

AL-MUSAWWAR has interviewed several SNDG representatives and has discussed with them Sudan's conditions, the al-Bashir government's invitation to the opposition to hold talks, the Sudanese regime's claims that it can end the country's problems, and, finally, the objectives behind the fabrication of external crises, especially with Egypt.

#### **Total Collapse**

'Ali Abu-Sinn, a member of the SNDG Political Bureau, has answered our questions, saying that in fact, the invitation to dialogue has never been made seriously because the front's government has declared its readiness to receive repatriated opposition members as citizens and to absorb

them in the regime, without recognizing them as independent organizations. Therefore, there is no call for dialogue or reconciliation. It must be emphasized that there is total estrangement between the opposition and the entire Sudanese people, on one hand, and the front government, on the other. There is no opportunity for dialogue. 'Ali Abu-Sinn, a former ambassador and a former director of the Arab League's African-Arab Cooperation Department, has also said that numerous reasons, some domestic and some external, have motivated al-Bashir's regime to escalate tension with Egypt. The internal reasons are, first, the economic crisis. The latest manifestation of this crisis is the petroleum products crisis, which has caused violent demonstrations in various Sudanese cities in wake of the failure of the theory of government projected by the front's regime. This theory has led to open protests in Sudan after a period in which people had submitted to the rule of oppression and intimidation. This means that the citizen has broken through the barrier of fear and that confrontation has become inevitable. The regime seeks to preoccupy the people with an external issue that it hopes will arouse patriotic and national emotions. But the Sudanese response to this endeavor has come in the form of anti-government, not pro-government, demonstrations. In Sudan, it is as if the Hala'ib crisis does not exist at all. The Sudanese people are not at all concerned with Hala'ib. Hala'ib does not preoccupy them, and it is not their urgent issue. What preoccupies the people is their domestic tragedy, which has emanated from the Islamic Front's rule. The second reason is embodied in the signs of military collapse in the south and the increased human losses in the Army's and militias' ranks.

The latest reports assert that the government has decided to postpone all urgent surgeries in Khartoum's hospitals in order to receive the wounded from the south.

As for the external reasons, they are due to the fact that radical Egyptian organizations have decided, in coordination with al-Turabi and on Iran's instruction, to launch a campaign against Egypt for fear that the Egyptian Government will succeed in ending terrorism of the country's radical groups. Egypt is, as we are aware, the main target of the international organization of Islamic movements. To the [Islamic] Front, it is justifiable to provide money, weapons, and propaganda support to radicals in order to create an open climate of hostility to Egypt.

Generally, al-Turabi and his front are well aware of the Egyptian people's love for the Sudanese people. This is why the front government has been annoyed by Egypt's sympathy for the Sudanese people. We believe that the legitimate Sudanese national leaders are committed to all the bilateral accords and to safeguarding the Egyptian interests in Sudan and the Sudanese interests in Egypt. As soon as al-Bashir's regime falls, the SNDG leaders will know perfectly well how to preserve the fraternal relations between the two people and the two countries.

#### **Political Game**

On the true objectives behind the front's escalation of its disputes with Egypt, Dr. Ahmad al-Sayid Hamad, who

has been minister in more than one cabinet since 1964, has said that the Hala'ib issue is not based on international law and is exploited by some governments, as happened when former Sudanese Prime Minister 'Abdallah Khalil raised this issue and used it as a political card. Perhaps this is what the front's government is doing, ignoring the fact that the matter is legal because the borders were marked under the bilateral administration by the well-known accords of 19 January 1899, which specify that Sudan's territory is located south of 22 degrees north latitude. In accordance with international law, this accord is an international accord concluded by (Cromer) and Butrus Ghali. When it became evident that the trade and human interests of al-'Ababidah and al-Bashshariyah tribes are interwoven, an agreement was concluded by the Sudanese and Egyptian Governments to establish a Sudanese bureau adjacent to Egypt to facilitate those tribal relations. This agreement remained valid until 1902 and was then renewed in 1905 and 1907, maintaining the same content. I believe that raising the issue in this manner seeks to harm the two peoples' relations, which must not be undermined out of concern for the higher national interests. They must not be used as a political game, because the relations are not just neighborly relations, they are also relations of a common life and vital interests between Egypt and Sudan.

#### **Years of Humiliation**

Mahdi Dawud al-Khalifah (al-Ta'ayishi), al-Ummah Party official spokesman in Egypt and the party representative in the SNDG, has characterized the front's ruling period as the years of humiliation, adding:

"The lasting historical relations that bind the two countries are above the triviality of the reckless. Because the Islamic Front government is not aware of the nature of these relations, it has begun to incriminate and assault the fraternal Egyptian people and their government. In my opinion, this campaign is intended to divert the citizens' attention from the domestic problems and crises. But the Sudanese citizen, who is aware of the value of these relations, has not been and will not be influenced by the front government's stance. This band has brought ruin and destruction to their country. Consequently, no good is expected from it for their brothers and neighbors."

As for closing the schools of the Egyptian Educational Mission, it suffices that Egypt realized as of the start of Sudan's independence that developing Sudan required human development primarily. This is why Egypt sought to establish schools for educational and scientific enlightenment in the southern part of the valley. These schools, totaling 17 in number, have been educating Sudan's citizens free of charge. Egypt crowned this effort by establishing the Khartoum Branch of Cairo University, where thousands of Sudanese receive their education. Egypt did not stop there. It has opened the doors of the Egyptian universities and has given priority to the admission of Sudanese students at the expense of Egyptian students, realizing that Sudan is in the direst need of educated cadres to lead its revival and development. It suffices to know that of the total number of Sudanese students who

study abroad, 85 percent receive their education at Egyptian universities and institutes. The remaining 15 percent are divided among the world's other countries.

#### Al-Turabi Allegations

(Malgok Ayom), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Sudan [SPLM] representative in Egypt and the Middle East, has said that the Sudanese opposition insists on toppling al-Bashir's regime, which has become isolated domestically and externally and which is faced with deteriorating economic conditions and tremendous popular wrath, plus the continued war in the south and in the Nubia Mountains.

He has said that the front's allegations about ending the war in the south are false and that the conflict cannot be settled by military means—means that have devastated the country's human and economic resources. Ending Sudan's crisis and the war in the south is accomplished, according to the SPLM representative, by toppling al-Bashir regime and convening a national constitutional conference to discuss the country's problems and issues on the basis of recognizing the country's cultural, religious, and ethnic differences.

The SPLM representative expressed the belief that the Sudanese Government has fabricated the Hala'ib crisis to cover up its deteriorating conditions and its collapsing economy, not to mention the Iranian regime's infiltration of the country, the front's regime's emulation of the Iranian regime, the coordination established between Tehran's and Khartoum's ayatollahs, and Khartoum's support for Egypt's terrorist groups. "I believe," Malgok Ayom has said, "that Sudan's future is in establishing a democratic Sudanese government on the basis of political pluralism, social justice, the separation of state and church, and the distribution of wealth by embracing balanced development in all parts of the country."

#### Adventurous Policies

Al-Tijani al-Tayyib, member of the Sudanese Communist Party's Political Bureau and the party representative in the SNDG, has said that the bloody dictatorship in Sudan is the product of the coup that was planned by the Islamic Front and that was executed by the leading cadres in the Army, plus its civilian cadres, who had received training in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Lebanon. The front contributed to the success of the coup, which exposed its real dimensions within the popular circles. The Islamic Front has established a violent oppressive dictatorship that has confiscated democracy and its institutions and expelled tens of thousands of the government's best workers and replaced them by its cadres. Thus, the Islamic Front has become the government. The front's regime has committed heinous crimes against the people. It has opened detention camps and "ghost houses" [torture chambers], exercised torture that has reached the point of murder, conducted rigged trials for its foes without any courts, pushed thousands of people into the war incinerator, and compelled hundreds of thousands to abandon their towns. The economic and financial crises have worsened; development has come to a halt; production has diminished; spending on war, security, and

foreign policy adventures has multiplied; inflation rates and prices have increased manifold; starvation has spread to numerous provinces; and health, educational, housing, and transportation services have deteriorated. The al-Bashir government's falsehood is also evident in its foreign policy, which is based on adventurism, on exporting terrorism, and on forging suspect alliances, especially the alliance with the Iranian regime, all of which is in conflict with the Sudanese people's interests and the interests of the Afro-Arab peoples.

Al-Tijani al-Tayyib went on to add: "We are experiencing these days a type of foreign policy that is based on adventurism and embodied in escalating the dispute over Hala'ib to the point of internationalizing this issue and of threatening to resort to armed confrontation. This policy is also embodied in annexing the Egyptian educational institutions in Sudan. It is no secret that the Egyptian regime seeks to conceal its worsening domestic crisis and to find a banger—in this case in the form of an aggressor enemy—on which to place the blame for the worsening political, living, and security conditions and with which to justify its policies of exporting terrorism and setting up saboteur camps.

#### No Dialogue and No Reconciliation

Faruq Abu-'Isa, an SNDG leader and a member of the SNDG Higher Coordinating Committee, said that "the most prominent features characterizing the Islamic Front's military government in Sudan are falsehood, hypocrisy, and dissimulation. Therefore, the front's alleged call for dialogue falls, as far as form is concerned, within the context of this characteristic, i.e. lying, hypocrisy, and lack of credibility. As for content, there is no backing down on our resolution in the SNDG not to cooperate, hold dialogue, or reconcile with the front's government. Rather, it is our duty to make serious daily efforts to topple the government and to restore democracy, party pluralism, and respect for human rights, so that the people, with their purity and their solidarity, may regain Sudan. We did not choose this severe position. Rather, it was chosen by the front, which swerved from national consensus; turned against democracy on 30 June 1989; liquidated all the constitutional institutions; abolished parties and unions; liquidated the judiciary, the Foreign Ministry, the armed forces, and the police; jailed the country's leaders; tormented the Sudanese people with kinds of torture they had never experienced before; insisted on continuing the war in the south and transformed it into a religious war; declared its blind malice against our people in the Nubia Mountains and Darfur; and engaged in ethnic cleansing in all parts of the country. One cannot, in the name of dialogue, sit at the same table, not to mention reconcile, with a regime that has such a black record."

Faruq Abu-'Isa went on to add that the al-Turabi plan, which is called an Islamic plan, is in conflict with the Arab plan, in which Egypt represents the heart. "For a long time, the front has harbored malice for Egypt, which represents civilization and enlightenment, whereas the front's plan represents darkness and isolation. Egypt represents the

front's antithesis. As for the practical aspect, the objective behind escalating the disputes with Egypt is to divert the Sudanese people's attention from their worsening problems and to draw this attention away from the the stifling crisis. They have failed to provide the citizen's essential needs even though they claim that they have come for salvation! I cannot understand why the Egyptian Educational Mission's schools in Sudan have been seized. Throughout many decades, these schools have provided teaching, educational, and cultural services for which our people will continue to be grateful to Egypt. Moreover, why is a crisis being fabricated over a piece of land that will make nobody fat or rich? If there is a dispute over this piece of land, then let it be settled with a fraternal spirit in the interest of both countries and not by seeking to create a clash between them. History will have no mercy for whoever leads our people in Egypt and Sudan to a military confrontation, because the historical fraternal relations between the two peoples accept no manipulation. Finally, I believe that the front's regime is in its death throes now that it has lost the components of its existence. Our people and their legitimate leadership, embodied in the SNDG, are capable of restoring Sudan to its people.

#### Fundamental Issue

Dr. Amin Makki Madani, head of the Sudanese Human Rights Organization, said that Sudan's current conditions have sunk into an unprecedented level of deterioration. The National [Islamic] Front, led by al-Turabi, has imposed a fundamentalist military regime that has confiscated democracy and liberties and recorded the most heinous human rights violations witnessed by all countries and organizations concerned with human rights. The regime's insistence on rejecting pluralism and the circulation of power, its projection of the military solution for the conflict in the southern part of the country, and its projection of ethnic cleansing in its western part in order to impose a religious state in which the minorities' rights are diminished—all this has led to tight domestic and international isolation which has caused the economy to collapse and prices to rise astronomically, thus making even the well-to-do incapable of meeting their essential living needs.

As for human rights conditions, the regime's record of violations is considered one of the worst in our modern world. This has led to the severance of economic and diplomatic relations and to resounding condemnation by the European Parliament, the U.S. Congress, the British House of Lords, and, finally, by a UN General Assembly resolution that was adopted on 3 December 1992 and supported by 104 countries. Only seven countries in which human rights conditions are almost similar to those in Sudan opposed the resolution. In the session it will hold next month, the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva will consider this issue and hear a report from an international expert whom it appointed in the session it held last year and who has visited Sudan recently. The commission will adopt the necessary punitive recommendations and submit its report to the General Assembly. Moreover, numerous countries have called for presenting

the conditions in Sudan to the Security Council so it will adopt the ban, economic blockade, or intervention it deems fit if conditions there don't improve.

#### Legitimate Command

The Sudanese Armed Forces are a participant in the SNDG and consider themselves the legitimate command. General Fathi Muhammad 'Ali was general commander of the armed forces prior to the coup. He heads now the legitimate command which includes a number of prominent commanders, among them Lieutenant General 'Abd-al-Rahman Sa'id and Major General al-Hadi Bushra Hasan.

Regarding the Sudanese Armed Forces legitimate command's vision of the conditions in Sudan, Lieutenant General 'Abd-al-Rahman Sa'id, a command member, said:

"The regime existing in Sudan now differs in essence and form from all the tyrannical regimes that managed to rule the country. Sudan is controlled now by radicals who have engaged in political action in the past period and who rely on a policy based on their continued control of power in spite of everything and at any price."

Regarding the Sudanese Army's conditions, [Sa'id said]:

"Prior to the Turabi-Bashir coup, the military establishment was a national vessel that absorbed its members by way of voluntarism, without regard for the numerical, ethnic, religious, or cultural makeup of Sudan's people. Since its creation, the military establishment had been known for its discipline, based on sound military systems of respect for military seniority, a sound chain of command, and traditions that emanated from a glorious history. The Islamic Front had developed its plan to seize power in Sudan on distorting those traditions and qualities, knowing full-well that it had no place in the supreme command of the army and of the other security forces."

"In order to ensure that the military establishment will not resist it, al-Turabi's front resorted to deviating the armed forces of their patriotic and capable elements who were committed to democracy and began to replace them by the front cadres, without regard for military capability or experience. Thus, the front succeeded in implementing its sabotage plan in the establishment and in the entire country without any deterrence from its conscience."

"Al-Turabi's front has also begun to diminish the status and prestige of the armed forces and other security forces by establishing parallel forces called the Popular Defense Forces and the Revolutionary Security. The front has been able to sneak these elements into every position and every institution so they will spy and report on their colleagues."

"The front has also implanted a spirit of malice, hatred, and desire for revenge among the [military] establishment members after it had displaced, arrested, and jailed the innocent and killed some of them. All this has been done without regard for any military traditions, laws, or regulations."

"Al-Turabi's front has also stopped building up and developing the national armed forces and has begun to organize

other security forces in a manner that serves its interest, with total disregard for the citizen's and the country's needs."

"Finally, al-Turabi's front has distorted the bright image of the military establishment that friendly and fraternal peoples have had in their mind. It has made this establishment unable to perform its well-known role of defending right and safeguarding peace in the Arab and African worlds."

#### **Women's Conditions**

Halimah 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Khalifah, information secretary of the Sudanese Women's Committee in Cairo and member of the SNDG, said:

"Under the front's terrorist regime, women have experienced the worst conditions ever. Sudanese women performed a magnificent heroic role in the national struggle movement, thus gaining their political, economic, and social rights. The women's issue was an issue that was discussed, projected, and examined by the democratic governments which believed that progress, advancement, and economic and social development could only be achieved if women are armed with knowledge and education and if it is acknowledged that it is important and essential that women share with men the positions of legislative and executive power and decision-making."

"But al-Turabi's terrorist front, which hides behind religion, has begun to roll back women's gains and to return women to the age of backwardness and darkness. Women have been subjected to dismissal, displacement, detention, and psychological and physical torture. Some of them have been sentenced to jail and others have been martyred in the resistance arena. A fanatic member of the front attacked a female employee at the Alms Tax Bureau and stabbed her to death. This is the first political assassination of a woman in Sudan."

#### **Misleading the Public**

(Abedon Agao Jak), representative of the [Union] of Sudanese African Parties (USAP), expressed the belief that Sudan's poor conditions are the outcome of lean years brought about by the rule of al-Turabi's front. Jak also said that the alleged call for dialogue is intended to mislead the public opinion at home and abroad.

He characterized the front's regime as a racist regime that poses a threat to the country's entity and unity and said: "Public resentment has reached its peak in Sudan. This is why the Sudanese regime is trying to conceal its defeats in the south and to divert the Sudanese people's attention from their main issues and from the acts of oppression and persecution it practices against the citizens."

#### **Front's Gang**

Munir Shaykh-al-Din Munir Jallab, official spokesman of the Islamic National Party, said that Sudan's current rulers are "an organized gang that has seized the country, that violates human rights regularly, and that practices national and ethnic oppression and persecution against all Sudanese. This gang has failed to solve the country's problems. Instead, it has drowned the country in a sea of

economic, political, and national crises. This is why it has resorted to fabricating a crisis with the sisterly Egypt, for which the Sudanese harbor all love and appreciation."

#### **Demonstrations Protesting Cost of Living Reported**

93AF0362B London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT* in Arabic  
4 Jan 93 p 1

[Text] London-Cairo (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT)—Popular demonstrations broke out yesterday in Madinat al-Thawrah [Revolution City], north of the Sudanese capital Khartoum, to protest high prices.

Eyewitnesses said that the demonstrators, most of whom were young people, shouted antigovernment slogans condemning the high cost of living and the government's economic policies.

Witnesses added that the police confronted the demonstrators, who burned tires in the streets, and succeeded in dispersing them. Last month, the city of Omdurman, which considered one of the suburbs, witnessed a women's demonstration to protest high prices, and the demonstrations have spread to other Sudanese cities outside the capital.

The gasoline crisis has returned again to Khartoum. Citizens have been unable to obtain their quotas of petroleum products for the last two days. Prevailing speculation is that the authorities intend to raise the price of gasoline to about 180 pounds a gallon. This follows last week's increase, which raised the price from 110 pounds to 150.

## **SYRIA**

#### **Censorship of Information Media Decried**

93AF0376A Jerusalem *THE JERUSALEM POST*  
in English 3 Feb 93 p 8

[Article by Tawfiq Husayn: "Deleted in Damascus: The News"]

[Text] Damascus—Deep down inside an anonymous government building in this city, my nemesis is burning the midnight oil. I imagine him and his colleagues working around the clock, leafing through suspect foreign publications, violently ripping out news and views offensive to the government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

They are hard at work, molesting thousands of magazines and newspapers, leaving their telltale mark in the form of a ripped page, a story amputated in mid-sentence, a magazine in tatters.

The faceless magazine molesters here do have a sense of humor: While they rip out without hesitation any story less than wildly complimentary of Syria (in other words, almost everything), they invariably leave the table of contents intact.

Experienced readers, anxious to know what the missing story was about, turn quickly to the front of the magazine to savor the tiny tidbit left behind. The offending article is

usually about Syrian involvement in international terrorism, the narcotics business in Lebanon, Islamic militants anywhere in the Arab world, Syria's position in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, human rights abuses, etc. The list is long.

Only the brain-dead could be satisfied with the news diet served up by the Syrian media. The country has three major Arabic dailies—AL-BA'TH, TISHRIN, and AL-THAWRAH—plus several regional and trade-union papers. All are controlled by the Ministry of Information. The big three are almost indistinguishable.

Their writing is colorless, and coverage is superficial. The emphasis is invariably on boosting the image of President al-Asad and conveying the perception that Syria is well-regarded the world over.

Visitors and foreign residents enjoy the dubious privilege of reading the SYRIA TIMES; its frightful English aside, the SYRIA TIMES provides little in the way of local news and usually devotes two to three of its eight pages to long-winded and painfully ungrammatical diatribes against one aspect or another of Israel.

The paper SYRIA TIMES is a sad shadow of the English-language daily in neighboring Jordan, the JORDAN TIMES, which is relatively unbiased, relatively accurate and not badly written.

Syrian television news follows the lead of the print media; the news usually begins with anything related to President al-Asad, then moves on to the latest "human rights abuses" by Israel. Viewers are always treated to file footage of the intifada, regardless of the news accompanying it. Once more, Jordan provides an unflattering contrast with programming that is technically good and fairly informative. That might explain why Syria has been jamming Jordanian TV broadcasts.

Syria's media are so poorly regarded that the most widely read item in the newspapers is the daily horoscope. For real news almost all Syrians prefer to listen to Radio Monte Carlo (whose station in Paris relays to our area via Cyprus), the BBC, the Voice of America, and, ironically, Israel's Arabic radio service.

Yet, while Syrians prefer foreign broadcasts, they treat them like blue movies—titillating in intimate groups but awkward in large mixed company.

As if in recognition of preference for foreign radio stations, the Voice of Damascus hourly news bulletin is broadcast at a quarter past the hour, by which time the others have finished. Still, while foreign broadcasts and publications are informative, their coverage of Syria is sporadic.

There is still a dearth of news—real news—about Syria, and the shortfall is made up by rumors.

Because there is no reliable local source of information on Syrian affairs, rumors often pass for news, and they frequently find their way into the foreign media, which mixes them up with the real news and sends them into the hands of the nemesis in the government basement here who, without a moment's hesitation, rips them out.

(Tawfiq Husayn is the pseudonym of a Syrian writer who surreptitiously submitted this article to THE JERUSALEM POST by means of an intermediary.)

## TUNISIA

### Merits of Dinar Convertibility Discussed

*93AF0398A Tunis CONJONCTURE in French  
Dec 92 pp 13-18*

[Article by L.C.: "The Convertibility of the Dinar: A Well-Earned Reward"—first paragraph is CONJONCTURE introduction]

[Text] The convertibility of the dinar, made possible by the dynamism of our economy, is the culmination of reforms. Under compelling new investment incentives, foreign investors are now free to repatriate their capital and profits and to convert the dinar earnings from their investments into foreign currency. Exporters may retain up to 20 percent of their earnings in foreign currency (to finance market prospecting activities, investments abroad, etc.)

In 1993, the Tunisian dinar will become a convertible currency. This means that our currency's rate of exchange will no longer be controlled; it will be "determined by trading on the market," in the words of Mr. Ezzedine Saidane, director of the Bank for the Economic Development of Tunisia (BDET). The decision to make the dinar a convertible currency was announced by Tunisia's president in an address to the Chamber of Deputies on 27 December.

This important and anxiously awaited decision, originally scheduled for 1997, boldly confirms (if confirmation is needed) the opening up of our economy to its environment and its integration into the milieu that has always surrounded it.

It is also the best illustration of Tunisia's determination to replace bureaucratic procedures with market mechanisms.

Last, the lifting of controls on the dinar—because this will amount to a freeing the dinar, in the final analysis—is the harbinger of accelerated development through greater and more fluid incentives to foreign investment.

What will be the effects of lifting exchange controls on the dinar?

At a press briefing following the president's announcement, CONJONCTURE listened attentively to the analyses offered by high-level officials (Mohamed Jeri, minister-director of the presidential office; Sadok Rabah, minister of the national economy; Mohamed Channouchi, minister of finance [as published]; and Mohamed el Beji Hamda, governor of the Central Bank of Tunisia).

In theory, convertibility means the freeing of a currency from controls; in practice, however, there are various degrees of decontrol. The convertibility of the dinar, as announced by the president, will apply only to current transactions. Its exact scope will not become apparent until after it has been put into practice—in other words, following the publication of the implementing legislation.

However, let us begin, as is customary, by examining the present state of affairs under exchange control in order to understand what convertibility will entail.

At present, the dinar is not freely traded on the market and is therefore exempt from the law of supply and demand. The dinar can be converted into other currencies only with the approval of the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT), i.e., under governmental oversight. In this, the Central Bank acts by virtue of its authority to set the exchange rate. The rate it sets must be realistic to the extent possible, so that the value of the dinar value remains in line with domestic prices. However that may be, a controlled rate of exchange is the most radical expression of a situation in which foreign currencies are in short supply, making it necessary for the government to regulate the flow of foreign currencies that are, after all, foreign means of payment. The existence of a link between inconvertibility and a scarcity of foreign currency is borne out by the facts: On the one hand, certain developing countries that are well-endowed with natural resources (oil and gas, for example) allow their currencies to trade freely; on the other hand, exchange control continues to be practiced by countries that have few natural resources and insubstantial foreign currency portfolios, even though their economies may be far more dynamic.

#### A Sign of Economic Dynamism

Tunisia has decided to free its currency because the Tunisian economy has demonstrated unusual dynamism. According to the president of the stock exchange in Tunis, Mr. Mohamed Salah Hmaidi, "the decision to make the dinar convertible in current transactions is the natural culmination of economic reform that has yielded positive results at all levels." Citing the undeniable fact that a currency's convertibility cannot be decreed and must be earned, Mr. Hmaidi points out that the Tunisian economy is sufficiently diversified, that broad lines of macroeconomic balance have been achieved, that external debt and inflation are under control, that customs and tax regulations have been scaled back to their lowest levels, that prices of most products have been decontrolled, and that the process is continuing. All of these factors justify the decision to make the dinar convertible, says the president of the stock exchange. He goes on to add, however, that "It is up to us Tunisians to make the most of this decision and successfully fight the battle of convertibility. As the president remarked, the competition in this area is fierce and relentless: All the countries of the world are vying to attract foreign investors with incentives."

#### Successfully Managing the Risks

On that score, all the indicators inspire optimism. Tunisia has already proved that it is capable of dinar convertibility as it was able to do in connection with the liberalization of foreign trade and the lifting of price controls.

Thus, from a strictly economic perspective, the convertibility of the dinar is a well-earned "plus" that will give our economy greater flexibility and increase its strong points, thus enabling it to attract more foreign investment. It is a

proven fact, accepted without reservation, that investment—particularly foreign investment—is the best alternative to indebtedness.

Tunisia's strengths are evident: political stability, respect for human rights, and for public and individual freedoms, a constantly growing and therefore healthy and dynamic economy, a skilled work force, and proximity to the world's largest market (Europe of 1993). There remained one last shackle to remove: the restrictions on the transfer of funds. Affecting both foreign investment and the current payments of companies, the restrictions were a major handicap weighing on our relations with foreign markets.

It is true that the various versions of the investment code have granted incentives and transfer exemptions to foreign investors.

Nonetheless, so long as the ability to transfer funds is not automatic and authorized by law, foreign investors will be hesitant or reluctant, all the more so given the existence of markets around the world offering complete freedom in this area.

#### A Lengthy Process

These same markets have proved that once foreign exchange reserves are well in hand, no hemorrhaging will occur. That risk is not to be feared in Tunisia. The link between convertibility and economic development has been demonstrated. When supported by an economy with strong production capabilities, convertibility is sustainable.

It cannot be denied that convertibility, in itself, is a lengthy process. Regulations and limitations will no doubt apply during an initial phase. Exporters will be authorized to retain all or a part of "their foreign exchange."

There is another approach that is specific to nonresidents: They would be allowed to trade the dinar against foreign currencies so that our currency would be introduced into the international market. Gradually, all restrictions on convertibility will be lifted, which means that exchange control will be totally abolished. Not even the developing countries have reached that point—at least very few of them have.

#### The Safe Path: Convertibility for Current Transactions

The managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Michel Camdessus, welcomed this initiative by Tunisia and, at the same time, characterized Tunisia's option as "reasonable" and in keeping with Article 8 of the IMF's by-laws. In limiting the dinar's convertibility to current transactions during the start-up phase, Tunisia has taken the realistic path. The term "current transactions" refers to transactions involving both exports and imports of goods and services. This means that, for residents, capital transactions will continue to require governmental authorization.

Therein lies an important detail not to be overlooked: The prohibition against the import and export of dinars (in the form of bank notes) remains in effect. But the main hurdle has been crossed in that three criteria considered by the

experts to be necessary conditions for enacting any form of convertibility have been met:

- Tunisia's balance of payments has a sustainable structure, as the prospects of achieving equilibrium in current accounts (goods, services, and current transfers) are present.
- Tunisia has sufficient foreign exchange resources and a sufficient margin of access to international credit. Plainly put, Tunisia is in a position to weather any unforeseen circumstances.
- By virtue of its economic stability and multisectoral dynamism, Tunisia is able to offer considerable non-resident access to the convertibility of the dinar. It is simply a matter of setting a realistic exchange rate that can be corrected by the markets.

### A Compelling Invitation to Investors

With the emergence of a world-wide economy, the trend is for companies to go outside national borders in their search for profits, to reach beyond the local context in order to weather difficulties and preserve their competitiveness. Tunisia, which has embraced change seeking to be receptive to the prevailing winds of our times, fully intends to attract a sizable share of the capital in circulation or what Paul Fabra has termed "transborder capital" in search of advantageous returns. In deciding to make the dinar convertible, the state has sent a compelling invitation to foreign investors who are, by nature, wary of any form of protectionism, but particularly monetary forms.

Foreign investment also includes purchases of shares on the stock exchange and foreign-currency purchases by nonresidents using dinars earned from investments. Such exchanges of dinars into foreign currency will be carried out directly by the domiciliary bank, without pre-authorization from the Central Bank of Tunisia.

### What's in It for Tunisian Citizens?

Convertibility will be a blessing in that it will translate into a more substantial supply of foreign exchange for the country, motivate foreign investors (technology transfer, new markets, etc.), and lead to the creation of jobs.

At the micro-economic level, it will have three benefits for Tunisian citizens:

- The annual tourist allowance will more than double, rising from 200 dinars to 500 dinars in 1993.
- The education allowance will increase by at least 40 percent, according to the governor of the Central Bank of Tunisia.
- It will be possible to hold both resident status (domestic income and assets) and nonresident status (income and assets abroad). While this was possible in the past, it was not authorized by law.

In summary, the convertibility of the dinar is a well-earned reward for the broad lines of macro-economic balance that Tunisia has achieved and will, in turn, preserve and strengthen that balance.

Thus, convertibility is not a "venture into the unknown." It has the unique quality of being an obvious necessity. The decision to lift controls on the dinar comes at an appropriate time, complementing numerous other measures: the gradual liberalization of imports (which is a partial form of convertibility, according to the experts), tax reform, the ongoing reform of the financial market and the liberalization of interest rates, the creation of professional foreign-currency accounts for exporters in which they may deposit up to 20 percent of their receipts, the authorization of special accounts in foreign currency or convertible dinars at Tunisian banks, reduction of the debt and debt service, and the effort to hold down inflation. The ball is now in the court of the companies and the banks which will have to adapt without delay to this "new way of economic life."

Undeniably, this is only a beginning. Other forms of convertibility, more advanced and bold, will come into being under a precise timetable but they will depend primarily on the response of the business world to this first phase.

### Convertibility in Practical Terms

[Box, p 15]

The convertibility of the dinar involves two very distinct areas: foreign trade and currency exchange transactions. It places Tunisia among the 47 countries that have enacted currency convertibility for current transactions (only 25 countries have enacted total convertibility).

Business operators will no longer lose time waiting for exchange authorization to be granted by the Central Bank of Tunisia.

In their current transactions (imports, exports, contracts...), business operators are free to make the appropriate business decision at the appropriate time—in other words, in real time. This gives them the ability to control production costs and avoid cost overruns that often result in work interruptions and a "stand-by" situation, leaving a business unable to compete. It should be noted that the Central Bank usually grants its authorization within a few days' time, not only for transfers and transactions but also for imports.

Business operators will discover that the convertibility of the dinar will enhance their ability to expand their managerial staffs or receive technical assistance. The implications of convertibility must not be overlooked, as technology transfer is very often a product of technical assistance.

In the sensitive and vital area of exports, businesses may now reserve 20 percent of their foreign currency earnings for market prospecting and promotion activities.

Exporters may also use that 20 percent of foreign currency earnings to make investments abroad. The only condition imposed is that the investment must serve the purpose of improving the business's export performance.

The foreign investor is completely free to repatriate capital as well as profits, whenever he deems repatriation to be in his interest. Thus, the restrictions in effect until now will

be abolished. This is a strong incentive for even the most wary of investors to set up operations in Tunisia.

#### A Public-Private Dialogue

[Box, p 16]

Sadok Rabah, minister of the national economy: "We know that our foreign exchange resources are limited, but in taking this courageous step President Ben Ali is counting primarily on the business community's sense of responsibility. A similar gamble was taken when prices were decontrolled. A great deal of apprehension was expressed at the time, but it was eventually dispelled by the reality, precisely thanks to that sense of responsibility."

Mohamed Ali Daghouth, president of the Exporters Club: "We viewed the challenges of 1993 with a great deal of pessimism. Prior to the [president's] speech on 27 December, we lacked the necessary mechanism to meet those challenges. In short, the convertibility of the dinar is a decisive, qualitative leap forward in our economic program."

Mohsen Ben Abdallah, president of the federation of exporters EDEX [expansion not given]: "Investment is the keystone of any economic system that advocates performance and dynamism. The problem lies in the cost of investment (imported machinery), tax privileges, and professional accounts (currently limited to 25 percent). (...) This historic decision leaves me with a very strong sense of responsibility. (...) The ball is now in our court."

#### Employment, Training Issues for Ariana Reported 93AF0395C Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 7 Feb 93 p 6

[Article by M'hamed Jaibi: "Employment and Training: Towards a Basic Reform"]

[Text] On Thursday, 4 February, in the conference room of the National School of Administration [ENA]’s Alumni Society, a conference on "the status and future for employment in the Ariana region" was held organized by the governorship in collaboration with the Ministry of Professional Training and Employment.

Beforehand Mr. Rouissi, who presided at the opening of the conference and was present at the discussion until the end, had learned of labor conditions in a certain number of professional training centers in the Ariana governorship. Accompanied by Governor Nejib Drissi and high-level regional cadres, Mr. Moncer Rouissi paid an extended visit to the Leather and Footwear Professional Training Center, where he was present at a signing ceremony for cooperation agreements between that center and several specialized industrial units in that industry whose aim is to train a certain number of young people and to set up "alternating" training programs. Before returning to the conference, the minister inspected the Regional Professional Training Delegation and the Ariana Regional Labor Bureau.

"Employment," said Mr. Rouissi, "has been a concern of the Tunisian state since independence," as he emphasized the special meaning that the Eighth Economic and Social

Development Plan gives to this issue. "The plan," the minister explained, "anticipates completely covering additional demand, that is, creating 64,000 new jobs each year." That, he would go on to say, can only come about if businesses work efficiently and the annual 6 percent growth rate is achieved.

#### A Question of Specificity

So for the minister, this is a matter of collective responsibility, "which each party, each structure, and each region must assume on its own."

Throwing out the notion that each governorship should organize a similar conference that would bring together businesses, educators, investors, the administration, and authorities in charge of agencies to promote employment, Mr. Moncer Rouissi emphasized how important it was to have a mastery of specific local issues when drawing up an efficient strategy in the area of employment. "Because," the minister went on to say, "only cooperation, dialogue, and collaboration can make future opportunities clearer, make it possible to have better knowledge of the labor market, and provide young people with a genuine opportunity to integrate into this market."

#### The Integration and Professional Aptitude Fund and Business Starts

While giving information on a 9 February meeting of a session of Parliament, which would debate the new laws regarding employment and training contracts, SIVP's [expansion not given] I and II, and other instruments developed by his ministry in the noble cause of employment, Mr. Rouissi asserted that henceforth all young people will be affected by training programs to see to their integration into economic and social life no matter what their training may be and no matter what type of school or university instruction they were able to receive.

The minister also reminded [his audience] of the importance of the Integration and Professional Aptitude Fund (FIAP), which is based on a promise by businesses to recruit young people trained at their request in special areas not available on the market. In this regard, Mr. Moncer Rouissi emphasized the prospect offered by the FIAP of financing a training [program] in order to create microbusinesses. "Small businesses," the minister said, "generate jobs in very large numbers, and currently employ close to 40 percent of the country's labor force."

"Employment," Mr. Moncer Rouissi concluded, "is a major choice for the country and a major challenge of the Eighth Plan; it will guarantee the country's stability by guaranteeing the stability of its social and economic system. So we should do everything to develop it. We should," he said, "develop our services, bring them closer to businesses and jobseekers, make known every existing resource in the area of training and employment and, by the same token, human resource management by business will have to improve so as to ensure the best expansion of production capacity both quantitatively and qualitatively."

**Support For Efforts To Innovate**

When he took the floor to deliver his speech, Mr. Mongi Bedoui, the director general of employment, reminded [his audience] of the high level of support given by the Ministry of Professional Training and Employment to any innovative effort in the area of resolving employment problems. "Because if these problems are very old ones," he said, "we must, thanks to innovation and creativity, absolutely find totally new solutions for them which are in accordance with the conditions peculiar to each sector and the peculiarities of each region."

Mr. Bedoui would explain that if the unemployment rate in the governorship of Ariana is the same as it is at the national level, that region's galloping demography poses major problems in the area of employment. Its growth rate is 6.3 percent compared with just 2.4 percent at the national level. Internal migration and the growth of new cities are reported to be responsible for this phenomenon, in particular the move by a large number of families from other governorships in the Tunis district into the Ettadhamen-Douar Hicher area. The speaker noted that as a result the employment strategy for the Ariana governorship absolutely must affect the entire district.

Mr. Mongi Bedoui then drew an extensive picture of the status of employment in Ariana, in which it appeared in particular that 45 percent of the employed labor force is in the service sector, that industry—in particular the textile industry—is growing strongly, with hiring prospects that the inadequacy of the specialized training provided in large measure negates.

"The agricultural sector," the speaker went on to say, "employs many workers; however housing poses a threat to agriculture, and agricultural jobs are threatened."

So these jobs must absolutely be protected and populations must be settled by sector consolidation. "This," said Mr. Bedoui, "is where the classic land problems and the usual cultural problems regarding tilling the soil get asked." Mr. Bedoui would make a list of the land issues under discussion, each time suggesting the position to take. First there is the problem of state lands, which is a national problem that is in the process of being solved. Next there is the startling advance of housing, which threatens and suffocates agricultural areas, causing them to shrink like a shagreen skin. And the speaker next told us that where the demand for housing was concerned, the Ariana governorship is number one in the republic.

According to Mr. Bedoui, "unemployment particularly affects those without education and training, so we have observed that 25 percent of unemployed Tunisian workers are illiterates." On the other hand, the speaker noted, a trained citizen who is unemployed is an untapped collective investment. All of which, Mr. Bedoui would explain, encourages us to do both national and regional studies in order to learn "who the unemployed are, why they are unemployed, and what their life is like." "For the Ariana governorship," he went on to say, "we have some figures, but studies must continue. We know that 25 percent of those unemployed are without work for just six months,

and that 65 percent remain unemployed for more than one year. Now at the national level, this 'hard core' is only 30 percent. Forty percent of those unemployed," the speaker went on to say, "are looking for their first job and have no experience of the working world."

**Failings To Recognize**

Mr. Bedoui would go on to say that there are failings that must be recognized, both in employment offices and at apprenticeship centers. "A basic reform," he said, "is necessary in employment offices so the unemployed come to have confidence in these employment offices." The speaker suggested taking a new look at professional guidelines, in particular for those newly arrived on the market.

The role of the private [sector] in employment was also stressed by Mr. Bedoui, who appealed for better understanding on the part of government workers and employment offices, which have an important role in their contact with investors and heads of businesses.

The speaker explained to the audience that "managing the employment market is going to be thoroughly readdressed so as to better adapt to the way in which a business recruits, and review conditions and constraints that have been required thus far with regard to hiring." In particular, the speaker wondered, "does the business really have to work through the employment office?"

Mr. Bedoui next reviewed the various instruments and training and employment programs and announced the decision that had been made to automate the management of the employment market. "Henceforth," he said, "we will no longer administer employment, we are going to manage it. We are going to propose services. Because," he explained, "we do not have to obligate employers to contact us but we do need to simplify the task so they can decide to recruit, even if we don't know it."

**The Training-Set-Up Formula**

As for training with an eye to creating microbusinesses, this seems well under way. The office has already set up a training center at Le Kram and is getting another one ready. Furthermore, as part of the FIAP, the ministry hopes to entrust the training of candidates to set up microbusinesses to authorized private training bureaus. This training, for which a fee will be paid, will be 100 percent financed under the terms of the criteria set out as part of the FIAP. The start-up of these training programs has run into one problem: who can guarantee that the young people trained in them will in fact start their [own] businesses? Thought was initially given to requiring the agreement in principle of a financing agency, but, given the low volume of needed investment and hesitancy on the part of banks, it would appear that things are going in the direction of more flexible solutions. Because the ministry will henceforth regard setting up training as of great importance. Training that could result not only in self-employment by the creator of the microbusiness but also probably in the creation of additional salaried jobs.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### Abu Dhabi Foreign Trade 3.9 Billion in 1992

93AE0340A London *AL-HAYAH* in Arabic 8 Feb 93 p 10

[Report from Abu Dhabi by Shafiq al-Asadi: "Abu Dhabi Foreign Trade Valued at \$4.9 Billion in 1992"]

[Text] The aggregate value of Abu Dhabi's foreign trade rose to about 17.8 billion dirhams (\$4.9 billion) from 14.4 billion dirhams in 1991. This is an increase of about 24 percent.

This jump in the value of Abu Dhabi's non-oil foreign trade is attributed to an increase in the value of imports last year. Import traffic expanded to supply the requirements of domestic projects, which swelled greatly after stagnating somewhat as a result of the Gulf crisis. Trade expansion is also attributed to the rising value of non-oil exports, even though re-exports have shrunk now that Gulf ports, especially in Kuwait, have returned to normal.

Figures released by Abu Dhabi customs in a report on 1992 foreign trade indicate that the value of Abu Dhabi imports in 1992 climbed by 34.8 percent to about 12.681 billion dirhams, up from 9.406 billion dirhams in 1991.

The weight of imports arriving overland and at Abu Dhabi's ports and airports likewise jumped to 2.032 million tons, from 1.670 millions tons in 1991.

The value of Abu Dhabi's non-oil exports rose last year to about 1.306 billion dirhams from 1.039 billion dirhams a year earlier. This is an increase of 267 million dirhams, or 15.7 percent. The weight of exports rose correspondingly by 43.7 percent, from 366 million tons in 1991 to about 511 million tons in 1992.

Abu Dhabi customs emphasized that the value of re-exports declined by 3.7 percent, from 4.015 billion dirhams in 1991 to 3.868 billion dirhams last year. By weight, however, re-exports moved upward by 5.6 percent, from 542 million tons in 1991 to 572 million tons in 1992.

Abu Dhabi 1992 imports from Japan were valued at some 2.785 billion; from the United States, about 1.55 billion dirhams; Germany, 1.38 billion dirhams; Britain, 1.308 billion dirhams; France, 755.5 million dirhams; Italy, 678 million dirhams; Qatar, 391 million dirhams; Switzerland, 325 million dirhams; and about 2.246 billion dirhams from other countries combined.

Abu Dhabi's 1992 non-oil exports to Saudi Arabia had a value of 628.3 million dirhams; to Qatar, 218 million dirhams; Kuwait, 156 million dirhams; Oman, 66.3 million dirhams; Nigeria, 32.3 million dirhams; the United States, 28.1 million dirhams; Lebanon, 24.5 million dirhams; Germany, 1,988 million dirhams; and the Sudan, 13.8 million dirhams. Non-oil exports to all other countries are valued at about 79 million dirhams.

Abu Dhabi customs said that in 1992 about 1.185 billion dirhams in re-exports were shipped from Abu Dhabi to Saudi Arabia; 744 million dirhams to Kuwait; 724.7 million dirhams to Qatar; 194.3 million dirhams to Syria; 173.3 million dirhams to Jordan; 145 million dirhams to

Libya; 120 million dirhams to Bahrain; 110.7 million dirhams to Yemen; 64 million dirhams to Egypt; and 202.2 million dirhams to all other countries.

UAE [United Arab Emirates] imports in 1992 were mostly in transport machinery and equipment valued at 6.517 billion dirhams, or 51.4 percent of aggregate import value; followed by 2.642 billion dirhams, or 20.8 percent of total value of imports, in assorted goods classified by material of manufacture; other assorted products valued at 1.059 billion dirhams, or 8.4 percent of total imports; foodstuffs and livestock valued at 976 million dirhams, or 7.7 percent of aggregate import value, and various other items.

UAE non-oil exports were mostly in items classified by material of manufacture valued at about 753 million dirhams, or 27.3 percent of aggregate exports; other classified goods valued at about 180.6 million dirhams, or 13.8 percent; foodstuffs and livestock valued at about 180 million, or 13.7 percent; transport machinery and equipment valued at 122.1 million dirhams, or 9.4 percent; chemicals valued at 222 million dirhams, or 17 percent; tobacco and refreshments valued at 93.2 million dirhams, or 7.1 percent; fossil fuel valued at 88.5 million dirhams, or 6.8 percent; and assorted other items.

Abu Dhabi re-exports in 1992 were in foodstuff valued at about 473 million dirhams, or 12.2 percent; refreshments and tobacco, 7.8 million dirhams, or 0.2 percent; raw materials, about 25 million dirhams, or 0.6 percent; chemicals, about 87.3 million, or 2.3 percent; items classified by material of manufacture valued at 515 million dirhams, or 13.3 percent; transportation machinery and equipment valued at 1.669 billion dirhams, or 43.2 percent; other classified items valued at 1.087 billion dirhams, or 28.1 percent; and assorted other items.

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### Government Prohibits Egyptians From Preaching

93AE0378A London *AL-HAYAH* in Arabic

28 Feb 93 pp 1, 4

[Article by Iqbal 'Abdallah]

[Text] Aden—Reliable sources in Aden said yesterday that the central government has asked the local authorities in Hadramawt Province, 620 km from Aden, to "expel to Sanaa a group of Egyptians, numbering more than 10, and to prohibit them from delivering sermons in mosques."

Earlier reports said the Egyptians came to Hadramawt under the pretext of tourism in order to visit historical relics, some of which date back to the early days of Islam and which abound in the province. But the Egyptians visited various districts in the province, advocating Islam and fighting against "infidelity and corruption." The source said that "the security authorities have been watching the Egyptians' activities, which turned out to be concerned with Islamic fundamentalism. They came to Yemen at the invitation of a major political party in order to deliver sermons, to preach, and to hold several seminars in the southern province's mosques. Before the unity on 22

May 1990, the province was under the rule of the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP], one of the two parties now in power." The sources added: "The security organs, particularly the province's intelligence, informed the central authorities in Sanaa of the nature of the activity these people these people are engaged in, and their affiliation with the Islamic Jihad Organization. The central authorities have asked for further accurate details and for maintaining surveillance of their activities in mosques. Security sources in the province, contacted from Aden, said that "the Egyptians, numbering more than 10, are instigating the citizens to struggle against the authority, particularly the two ruling parties, the General People's Congress [GPC] and the YSP, allegedly because of their "corruption, combatting Islam, and allowing infidels to work in Yemen, the Islamic country."

The security sources added that "the security organs have been unable to arrest those men, because under the laws of the land, they did not commit any crime that calls for their arrest. What they have been doing comes under the freedom of expression. But certain regulations empower the authorities concerned to deport them from the country."

But the question of the "Egyptians" has caused repercussions among the citizens and political parties and organizations' representatives in the province. The parties called on the local authorities "to intervene in order to stop this activity, which is hostile to the country and which aims at sowing sedition among the citizens."

Hadramawt Province was the only southern province (formerly South Yemen) that did not experience any acts of terrorism, as those that occurred in the rest of the southern provinces between late December and early January this year.

It is not known yet if the central authority in Sanaa intends to expel the Egyptians or to investigate them, although it has confirmed that they were invited to come to Yemen to work as teachers in religious schools, which the government recently decided to put under the Ministry of Education's control.

On another level, political sources in Sanaa said the tug-of-war inside the YSP over the question of unifying the two ruling parties is continuing. Asked about the truth regarding what has been published by some media sources and alleged to be minutes of a presidential council meeting at which President 'Abdallah 'Ali Salih is quoted as saying that the objective of unifying the parties is to continue to remain in office, the sources told AL-HAYAH that the minutes that were published in Yemen "are absolutely untrue."

The sources expressed their "regret for the publication of these falsehoods and intrigues. They consider the publication of such falsehoods, particularly now, to be the work of suspect sources whose aim is to disturb the calm political atmosphere that has prevailed following easing of the situation."

The sources said the contents of the alleged minutes are designed to mislead the press and to disturb the atmosphere of the current dialogue between the GPC and the YSP, which is aimed at developing relations between them to a degree that would enable them to merge into one political organization with one unified political will.

The sources expressed the hope that the "press will verify the truth of information before publishing it so as to avoid falling prey to intrigues and falsehoods that undermine its credibility and cause it to lose the readers' respect."

#### **YSP Names Candidates for General Election**

*93AE0384A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
27 Feb 93 p 1*

[Article by Lutfi Shatarah: "YSP Presents Candidates Today; Yemeni Leadership Debates Government Formula"]

[Text] Aden—The Yemeni Presidential Council will hold its anticipated special meeting today or tomorrow to examine the steps necessary for ensuring stable government activity now that Engineer Haydar al-'Attas has decided to run as candidate for a district of Hadramawt Governorate, which he represents, in the general elections that are scheduled for 27 April 1993. Consequently, al-'Attas has to resign from the government, which means constitutionally and technically that the government has to resign.

Al-'Attas revealed his plan to run for election at the meeting the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP] Election Committee held two days ago. Four ministers from the General People's Congress [GPC] and one YSP minister have tendered their resignations in writing to the prime minister. A number of YSP ministers have made it clear that they will run for election.

A meeting of the YSP leadership has resulted in agreement on a candidate list that includes al-'Attas; Dr. Yasin Sa'id Nu'man, current Chamber of Deputies speaker; Muhammad Ahmad Sulayman, housing and urban planning minister; Salim Jubran, fish resources minister; Salih 'Abdallah al-Muthanna, transportation minister; Salih Abu-Bakr Husaynun, oil and mineral resources minister; and 'Abd-al-Wasi' Sallam, justice minister.

Even though some ministers had been expected to run for election, the large number is a surprise, especially because the current cabinet has only two more months in office and because a new cabinet will be formed after 27 April in light of outcome of the elections.

Some sources have pointed out that a number of YSP Political Bureau members, including Yahya al-Shami, will run for election and that the party candidate list will not be confined to ministers and politicians, but will include writers, journalists, men of letters, economists, a number of people with other interests, and some people with parliamentary experience.

While the YSP prepares to submit its candidate list to the Higher Elections Committee no later than this evening, which is the deadline for submitting names of party

candidates to the committee, certain sources find it unlikely that Muhammad Sa'id 'Abdallah, the minister of local administration, will run for election because he agreed in principle not to nominate himself when he was appointed member of the Higher Elections Committee. 'Abdallah is this committee's deputy chairman.

**'Umar on Party Name, Muslim Brotherhood**  
*93AE0385A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic*  
*9 Mar 93 pp 26-27*

[Interview With Jarallah 'Umar, YSP Political Bureau Member and Political Department Chairman, by Lutfi Shatarah in Aden; date not given: "Jarallah 'Umar to AL-MAJALLAH: It Is Time We Changed Our Name; Our Program Has Nothing To Do With Socialism"]

[Text] Aden—It has been reiterated in the Yemeni political arena that leaderships of the two ruling parties—Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP] and General People's Congress [GPC]—will perhaps take the step to merge the two parties within a single new political organization before 20 March. Even though these reports are based on statements by Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the facts confirm that the YSP faction that rejects the principle of a swift merger has been able to upturn all the expectations that the merger will take place before the elections. The committee headed by Salim Salih Muhammad—a committee that includes GPC and YSP leaders and seeks to clear the air—has suspended its meetings and Salim Salih has arrived in Aden suddenly. This is a sign that this committee has reached a deadend.

AL-MAJALLAH has interviewed Jarallah 'Umar, YSP Political Bureau member and Political Department chairman, who heads the faction rejecting a swift merger.

[Shatarah] What are the reasons for the enthusiasm of some members of the two ruling parties for merger during the period preceding the first elections?

[Umar] The proposal for a merger before the elections has been presented by the GPC, and it has been debated by the party in the normal way. The GPC sees that it is in the supreme national interest to make the merger before the elections. But in our party, the Central Committee has a different opinion, namely that the merger should not be brought about by a decision from above and should not be just a solution to a new crisis or to a certain crisis. The merger is a political and intellectual issue, and it should materialize within the context of development. Moreover, the decision on this sort of issue is up to the YSP General Congress, not its Central Committee or Political Bureau.

[Shatarah] You are a radical, or one of those who reject any steps that move the YSP and PGC closer to each other and lead to merger. Why?

[Umar] I believe that making an immediate decision on two parties, one of which is dozens of years old, is a mistake. Those who consider this decision proceed from a totalitarian thinking. Those who speak of dialogue and choice are right. I believe that the right way to categorize

this issue is to view it as an issue of totalitarianism and democracy, not of radicalism and moderation.

[Shatarah] But it is noticed that your party's secretary general ('Ali Salim al-Bid) is inclined toward merger.

[Umar] The secretary general has spoken repeatedly of dialogue and of the importance of strengthening relations. We agree with him on this. He says that merger is possible. I, too, says that it is possible and debatable. But it cannot be accomplished without institutions.

[Shatarah] It is said that the YSP fears that the GPC will enter into alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba'thists and that the YSP is seeking a strong alliance with the GPC for fear that it will lose the coming elections if it takes the risk of waging them alone.

[Umar] From a partisan aspect, the YSP does not, of course, welcome or wish for an alliance between the GPC and the Muslim Brotherhood. This is natural, and it cannot be concealed. But our party cannot prevent such an alliance. Our party has a political program and a modernization program. It hopes that the GPC will be on its side or that it will line up with the largest number of political parties and blocs to accomplish this program. In any case, our party will accept the outcome of the elections, whatever it will be, and it will be prepared to occupy the opposition seats.

**Charge Against Brotherhood**

[Shatarah] Does this mean that you accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of openly opposing your plan?

[Umar] This is no accusation. The Muslim Brothers say this and expound on the importance of returning to the caliphate era. We know that this age is different from the age of the Ottoman caliphate. We have not accused them. They confirm what we say with their slogans and programs. They reject the constitution and the laws; they suspect any act that calls for development, and they urge the boycotting of the age in which we live.

[Shatarah] Even though socialism has, as an ideology and a political system, disappeared from the world's political map, your party continues to cling to this name?

[Umar] The name has been there since the party was founded, and it can be changed only on a resolution by the General Congress. I believe that the time has come to change it. The problem is not socialism or capitalism. Yemen's problem is the problem of building a national structure, establishing equality among citizens of the same country, building the state of law and order, and solving the health and educational problems. The YSP program is a program for modernization. Our program is free of any word connected with socialism. Form must comply with content, and numerous names have been proposed as a replacement for the party's name. But there are also those who reject changing the name.

**Security Issue**

[Shatarah] The security issue is one of the most prominent issues raised by your party in any dialogue. Does this mean that you accuse the GPC and hold it responsible for lawlessness?

[Umar] This is no accusation. The YSP brings up this issue repeatedly for two reasons: First, because it is the party against whom violence has been used, and everybody knows this. The YSP has offered more than 40 martyrs since unity began. It is well-known that many of its leaders have been subjected to attempts on their lives. So it is natural the YSP is more concerned with this issue. The second point is that the YSP sees that implementing the reform programs, modernizing and stabilizing the country, and enhancing investments in the country are tied to political and security stability. From this angle, security is a must for any growth or development in the country.

The final reason is that the YSP believes that the security agencies are not performing their duty as they should and that there is negligence in this regard. Instead of the self-security imposed by people, there has to be state security. I believe that what the security agencies have done in Lahaj, Aden, and Abyan (southern governorates) has demonstrated that the security agencies have enough experience, ability, and sense of responsibility to eliminate terrorism in the bud.

[Shatarah] What is the motive behind the repeated attacks on your cadres, and what are the reasons for your silence on the attacks?

[Umar] The party has not been silent. We have issued statements but we have avoided accusing particular circles. We have also avoided threats, the use of our influence in the government, and any rash reactions.

[Shatarah] In the past, your party viewed the tribe as a manifestation of backwardness. How do you view now the tribal institution, which has become a major part of society's political balances and of balances in your party, now?

[Umar] Yemeni tribes accept the government and accept law and order. I believe that the tribe in Yemen is a social and economic institution no longer. However, our party opposes the use of tribal jingoism to impede development or to oppose law and order. This does not mean hostility toward the tribe, because a tribesman is a citizen before anything else. We have all come from villages and from the countryside. But the politicians' conflicts and their need to maneuver against each other have, at times, aroused tribal rancors. The tribe is not an element of balance within the party. Nobody in the party leadership is the representative of a certain tribe. Political position is what is most important to us. To start, we have no complex regarding this issue. But because of the absence of democracy and openness, the conflict within our party has begun to assume totally violent forms, including enlisting the assistance of the military institution to settle situations, as happened in the incidents of 13 January 1986.

[Shatarah] Do you expect the Army to intervene to settle the outcome of the elections by force if one of the two partners loses? What I mean is: Will the YSP enlist the help of the Army if it loses the elections?

[Umar] The Army has been unified administratively and politically. There is one command and one administration, and there are uniform laws. What remains is intellectual and psychological unification, which will take a long time. The YSP will accept the outcome of the vote, whatever it may be, and we will not resort to any illegal activity to make up for a loss.

**From Government to Opposition**

[Shatarah] Your party complains that its cadres are fought and are not given powers in the positions they hold, even though it is a partner in the government. Aren't you afraid that you will be greatly marginalized if you move from the government to the opposition?

[Umar] I want to stress that there are 13 papers that assail the YSP or are designated to assail it. No act of assassination can ever change, topple, or establish a regime. The YSP can endure this assault. But it wants the other political parties to continue to fight acts of violence, lest they take root and pose a threat to everybody. Naturally, if our party joins the opposition and is subjected to any hostile acts, it will resort to the law. We cannot be overlooked in the Yemeni arena.

[Shatarah] The Yemeni arena has experienced recently a large-scale wave of violence that has extended to Aden and touched prominent leaders. Who, in your opinion, stands behind this wave?

[Umar] We have familiarized ourselves with many interrogations conducted with defendants. It has become evident that an organization called Jihad stands behind these acts. It is financed by somebody called Usamah Bin-Ladin, who lives in Sudan. His presence in Sudan is incompatible with the friendly relations that bind the Yemeni and Sudanese peoples. We are waiting, of course, to see what the Sudanese Government can do. I believe that the Yemeni Government is considering a direct discussion with Khartoum on this issue, especially since some individuals wanted by the law in Yemen are living there.

[Shatarah] It has been noticed that Jihad's assault is focused on the YSP cadres and strongholds. Is there a connection between these attacks and what can be described as settling old political accounts?

[Umar] Violence is a path that rejects the polling box and that seeks to attain power with force. As for attacks on YSP cadres, they are because the YSP is moderate and objective in its activities and tendencies. But I believe that the violence will include others and will turn against the other parties in the future. Terrorism sets its priorities without making a distinction between one party and another.

**Parties' Merger Splits YSP Leadership**

93AE0376A London *AL-HAYAH* in Arabic  
1 Mar 93 pp 1, 4

[Article by Iqbal 'Ali Abdallah: "Yemen: Idea of Merging Two Parties Creates Split in Socialist Party's Leadership"]

[Text] Aden—Authoritative sources of the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP], one of the two ruling parties, have asserted that the "issue of merging the party with its partner, the General People's Congress [GPC], has created an evident split in the YSP leadership, which sees that the fabrication of this issue in this sensitive phase (reference to the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held on 27 April 1993) is aimed primarily at striking the YSP by abolishing democracy and creating splits within its leadership."

The sources have noted that "one of the YSP's two leaders (a reference to Salim Salih Muhammad, Presidential Council member and YSP assistant secretary general) has stressed that the idea is not new and that it was raised on various occasions and for several purposes, especially in wake of the return of 'Ali Salim al-Bid, Presidential Council vice chairman and YSP secretary general, to Sanaa after months of retreat in Aden, beginning in August 1992."

The sources added that the "YSP rejected this idea totally, whereas its partner (GPC) has clung to it, proposing that the merger be declared by the middle of March at the latest by merging the two parties' comparable leadership bodies into unified bodies and that the merger documents be approved at a joint meeting of the two parties' leaderships. Meanwhile, the YSP wing led by Salim Salih and Jarallah 'Umar has proposed that talks between the two organizations continue and that the merger process should not be turned into some sort of leaping and fleeing forward. Rather, the two parties should embark on more advanced forms of relations that develop gradually from coordination to strategic alliance. If these activities lead to a merger, then this merger will have come about naturally and it will be approved by the two organizations' leaderships and bases. It will be a voluntary merger that is destined to survive."

The same sources have revealed that the "committee formed last February under the chairmanship of Salim Salih Muhammad to clear the air between the two organizations has not been able to produce definite results. Rather, it has even failed to carry on with its meetings, as proven by Salim Salih's presence in Aden for [the past] three weeks." The sources added that the "YSP's stern wing that rejects the merger idea believes that the issue is intended to liquidate the YSP and fuse it in the GPC." This wing asserts that a "resolution the YSP Central Committee (the party's top authority) adopted in the session it held in the middle of last January empowers the Political Bureau to examine any proposals to enhance the level of relations with the GPC. The committee set a ceiling for this dialogue that does not reach the level of unification, considering that dissolving the party or merging it with another party is not within the jurisdiction of the Central Committee or the Political Bureau but the

jurisdiction of the party's general congress." This is a reference to the fourth congress that the YSP has not been able to convene because of all the severe disputes within its leadership ranks.

Moreover, Aden's political circles believe that the "current splits that have developed within the YSP leadership ranks as a result of the merger issue constitute a serious landmark in the YSP's course, threaten its organizational future, and weaken its position in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 27 April 1993. Moreover, these splits may lead the country to new problems which will be added to the economic, security, and political problems currently shaking the the newborn democratic experiment...."

Sources of the GPC, which is led by Lieutenant General 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, have emphasized that the "path to safety and deliverance from the negatives and to preserving unity of the two organizations, the YSP and the GPC, is found fundamentally in merger, the option to which there is no alternative." The sources noted the statement the GPC leader made recently to a European broadcasting station, namely that the "merger is coming, regardless of whether before or after the elections. There is agreement between the two organizations' leaderships on this issue." This statement has motivated some YSP members who reject the merger to suspend their party, even governmental, activity, to retreat to Aden, to allude to a party split, and even to supply weapons to the elements who support them in Aden and Lahij Governorates.

**Advice Given to Government, Parties, Voters**

93AE0378C Aden *UKTUBAR* in Arabic 28 Jan 93 p 8

[Article by Salim 'Umar Husayn]

[Text] The general parliamentary elections, the first actual steps of which began last week with the process of registration, are considered to be the first experiment of its kind in Yemen since the unification and proclamation of the Republic of Yemen.

This democratic process faced a host of difficulties and complex issues in the course of its preparations. This is due to the fact that it is a new experiment that has not yet taken root in the political culture and has not been accepted by a large section of the Yemeni people—not because these people reject democracy, its applications, and its outcome, but because the majority of the people are apprehensive about the situation that might follow the election. The fact that should be realized is that the general elections, including parliamentary elections, are a legal right that is guaranteed by the Yemeni Constitution. The elections will enable the people to elect their representatives in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time. The deputies, in turn, will select the new government and determine its powers.

This fact should not cause fear or apprehension of the unknown. Rather, it should confirm an important matter, which is that the people are the source of power. The

guarantee of this right lies in fully recognizing the democratic course and strengthening it in both political and social life.

What is even more important is strict adherence by everybody—government, parties, and social powers—to impartiality and integrity of the parliamentary elections. It is also important to ensure facilitating the electoral process, both for citizens and candidates. In order for the general elections to realize their objectives, it is imperative that there should be total belief in the integrity of the elections at all stages. All means possible should be made available for the electoral process to succeed and for ensuring the strict application of the election procedures.

We never doubt the fact that all of the parties want the elections to be held in an atmosphere of trust and realization of the importance of adhering to the rule of the ballot box. Winning candidates in these elections should be judged on the basis of the people's votes, without interference, compulsion, or dictation by any party whatsoever. Adherence to this democratic behavior calls for strengthening confidence between the parties and the social powers and for recognizing the importance of the people electing their representatives, with every party having the right to engage in campaigning for itself on the basis of programs for building the Yemeni democratic edifice that shall never be shaken.

The wheels of democracy have started turning, and we should enhance this turning in order to promote democratic traditions. Parties, popular organizations, grassroots organizations, and the masses should effectively help in strengthening democratic life in order to create a democratic tradition, modernize it, and entrench it in Yemeni life.

The fact that the first executive steps have been taken to ensure the success of the first parliamentary elections in the Republic of Yemen is a great triumph of the will of the people. Everybody agrees on proceeding with these steps until their successful end. If the parliamentary elections succeed and it is proven that they were clean and honest, we will be laying the cornerstone for building a democratic edifice for Yemen that will never be shaken.

The immediate task before the authorities, the parties, and all the social powers lies in taking the following steps:

First: Launching intensive publicity regarding the need to register at the registration centers, which can be found in all parts of the country. It should be made clear that this is a legal right that is guaranteed by the Constitution. Voters must exercise their right to choose their legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. It is important that the government and private media explain the election law and all of the procedures that are relevant to it, as were recently spelled out by the Higher Committee on Elections. It is also important to simplify instructions to the public in order to be on par with their intelligence, particularly because people suffer from educational and political illiteracy, not to mention legal illiteracy. Encouraging the people to register is a national, almost sacred, task. This is because such action would enable the people understand

their constitutional right to elect their legislative authority, in preparation for achieving the objective of popular participation in administering the state.

Second: Political campaigning by all of the state-owned papers, party papers, and privately owned papers should be honest and void of altercations and should not create tension. The campaigns should be based on programs, methods, and means that enhance the democratic process of elections. The ballot box should be the arbiter. All of the media, including the official media, should reaffirm the soundness of electoral procedures and operations. They should expose any kind of tampering with the electoral process and ensure its integrity and impartiality.

Third: It is extremely important at this preliminary stage of the parliamentary elections, the stage of registration, that we prevent distortions and misrepresentations. Security measures should be taken to protect balloting stations, and means should be provided to ensure the unhindered passage of citizens to ballot stations in order to register. Loudspeakers should be one of the means to be used in residential areas for this purpose. Also vehicles with mounted loudspeakers should tour residential areas, inviting people to register. The loudspeakers should be used to explain to the public what documents they should have with them, the importance of registering, and the consequences for those who fail to register.

The success of the first stage of the elections is essential. Popular, official, partisan, and individual efforts should be intensified in order to achieve this success because the success of subsequent stages of the parliamentary elections depends on it.

### **Section of Election Law Explained**

*93AE0378B Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 28 Jan 93 p 8*

[Article by Taha Ghalib]

[Text] Election Law 41 of 1992 has been called the "General Elections Law" and not the "private elections law" because all citizens of the various strata, factions, and social categories are taking part in the elections on the grounds that it is one of their rights that have been guaranteed by Article 13 of the Constitution, which provides that the election law applies to every citizen. Every citizen who meets the election conditions, that is, who is a Yemeni of at least 18 years of age, is entitled to vote. Excluded from this, according to Article 3 of the Constitution, are naturalized individuals who have not yet completed the designated legal period of time stipulated in the naturalization law, which is 15 years from the date naturalization is obtained.

What is meant by general elections is, as we have already said, participation in these elections by all factions, without their being exclusive to a particular faction, such as is the case in elections in mass organizations where, for example, they are exclusively for women in the Women's Union, the workers faction in trade unions, or the youth in the Youth's Union.

In the general elections, there is no difference between men and women; both sexes have the same rights to vote and to run as candidates. Article 7 of the Constitution provides that the citizens are equal before the law in terms of rights and obligations and that there is no discrimination between them on the basis of sex or anything else.

Article 14 of the law charges the Higher Committee on Elections with the responsibility to take steps to encourage women to exercise their voting rights and to set up a women's committee to undertake registering women and to verify their identity on the election day. This was what actually happened at the beginning of the registration period. Special places have been provided for women in the designated election stations within every electoral constituency.

Based on this information, it is clear that women have the same rights as men because this right has been granted by the Constitution and the law. This is a positive step that has been taken by the legislators. Until recently, women in some provinces of our country were deprived of this right, as is the case in many Arab countries.

A general election is the immediate method for people to exercise this right by electing representatives to the Chamber of Deputies.

### Foodstuff Prices Jump 27 Percent

93AE0384B London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT* in Arabic  
24 Feb 93 p 13

[Text] Aden—The prices of a number of essential food commodities, such as dairy products and sugar, which are breakfast diet items in Yemen, have risen more than 27 percent. Citizens have been complaining about the sudden price increase, especially because they have not received the 40 percent pay raise approved by a joint meeting of the Presidential Council and the cabinet at the end of last year. Meanwhile, Fadil Muhsin 'Abdallah, the minister of

supply and trade, said that the reason for the sudden jump is the insistence of truck drivers not to transport goods to the governorates unless the transport tariff is increased. This has compelled the importers of these commodities to raise their prices in order to cover the difference in transportation cost.

The price of a powdered milk has risen from 200 shillings to 260 to 270 shillings per can, i.e., from \$21 to \$27 at the official exchange rate. Three years ago, the same can was sold for 25 shillings, or the equivalent of \$3.57.

Some economists expect prices in general to rise in the near future as a result of a step that will be taken by the Central Bank, which will put 5 billion riyals in 50-rial bills into circulation. This step was announced in the press, and it had been agreed to have the money printed prior to the unity. But the money was returned to (Dillard), a British firm that prints money, because of some technical errors. This sum will be put into circulation in the markets without the withdrawal of an equivalent sum in wornout bills, whether in riyals or dinars, which will lead to higher inflation rates.

This jump in prices contrasts with what Muhammad al-Zubayri, deputy chairman of the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, said in his recent press statements when he asserted that the federation had drafted a plan to stabilize prices for the next three months, including the price of such processed goods as oil, milk, and so forth.

Al-Zubayri also said that commodities not financed by the Central Bank, including dairy products, rice, flour, and wheat, are imported with dollars, and their cost and price are subject to dollar prices. The Ministry of Supply is responsible pricing these commodities. Al-Zubayri demanded that the Central Bank put more dollars into circulation in the market, withdraw a quantity of riyals, or secure a larger volume of local currency to finance foreign trade as much as possible.

## BHUTAN

**Jigme Singye Wangchuk Interviewed in Calcutta**  
*93AS0599A Madras THE HINDU in English 29 Jan 93 p 6*

[Text] Calcutta, Jan. 28—"Mr. Jyoti Basu and I agree on the need to maintain close cooperation and working relationship, which we have, in dealing closely with the terrorist problem in southern Bhutan. We have discussed this problem which has not only disturbed our southern districts, but made life difficult for all the people on both sides of the border. The continuing terrorist menace has endangered seriously the lives of our people and disturbed the peace in parts of West Bengal," said King Jigme Singye Wangchuk of Bhutan, who was on a four-day private visit to Calcutta recently.

The Bhutanese monarch told THE HINDU in an exclusive interview here: "Both Mr. Basu and I agree that we will never allow our territories to be used against each other's interests. We have both reaffirmed our commitment not to allow such anti-social elements to disrupt the excellent working relations and the genuine friendship which has always existed between Bhutan and the West Bengal Government."

The King said that the allegations made by some Nepalese sources that "Bhutan is dragging its feet in finding a solution to the problem is certainly not true. We have in the last 13 months met the representatives of the Nepal Government eight times."

### "Wrong Protocol"

"Meanwhile, Nepal deputed its Foreign Secretary to Thimpu twice. A representative of the ruling party in Nepal also came twice. Although senior officials of the Royal Government of Bhutan advised against it because it is wrong protocol, I insisted on meeting them myself."

"The fact that we had eight meetings in 13 months speaks for itself. Unfortunately, nothing substantial has been achieved. The reason is obvious," he said.

Replying to questions, the King said, "When I met Prime Minister Koirala in Colombo, there were only 5,000 so-called refugees in the camps. I requested Mr. Koirala not to allow or encourage people to come to the camps, since it would increase in influx. But the Prime Minister informed me that he could not stop or discourage these people for political reasons."

He said, "Today, it is reported that there are more than 70,000 persons in the refugee camps, and they are all being acknowledged and accepted as Bhutanese nationals."

He said the current "political environment in our region is not conducive for the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] summit."

The Bhutanese Monarch said that "it would be far more productive to hold the summit when there is an improvement in the present state of bilateral relations between the member countries. Unless we have good relations among all the member countries, it will not be possible to make SAARC a successful regional body."

### Solidarity With India

Answering questions about his recent official visit to India, the King said, he had a most successful visit, as Indo-Bhutan relations had always been free of problems. "The main purpose of my visit was to reaffirm and consolidate our warm and close friendship. For us in Bhutan, India's interests and well being are always close to our hearts. I wished to express the complete solidarity and support of the Bhutanese people to the Government and the people of India, especially at a time, when India faced a very difficult situation."

"In New Delhi we signed an important agreement on the Sunkosh Multipurpose Project, one of the largest multi-purpose dam projects in South Asia," he said.

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